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In Populations, Public Health and the Law, legal scholar Wendy Parmet urges 
courts to embrace population-based legal analysis, a public health inspired 
approach to legal reasoning. Parmet contends that population-based legal analysis 
offers a way to analyze legal issues—not unlike law and economics—as well as a set 
of values from which to critique contemporary legal discourse. Population-based 
analysis has been warmly embraced by the health law community as a bold new way 
of analyzing legal issues. Still, population-based analysis is not without its 
problems. At times, Parmet claims too much territory for the population perspective. 
Moreover, Parmet urges courts to recognize population health as an important norm 
in legal reasoning. What should we do when the insights of public health and 
conventional legal reasoning conflict? Still in its infancy, population-based analysis 
offers little in the way of answers to these questions. This Article applies population-
based legal analysis to the constitutional problems that arise when states condition 
public assistance benefits on passing a drug test, thereby highlighting the strengths 
of the population perspective and exposing its weaknesses.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, three dozen states considered bills that require applicants to pass a drug 
test before they qualify for income assistance through the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families Program (TANF).1 Several state legislatures have also proposed 
bills that would require applicants to pass a drug test in order to qualify for food 
stamps, public housing, home-heating assistance, and unemployment benefits.2 To 
date, eight states have passed laws conditioning public assistance benefits on passing 
a drug test: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
and Utah.3 Proposals to condition public assistance on passing a drug test have also 
                                                
1 A.G. Sulzberger, States Adding Drug Test as Hurdle for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/states-adding-drug-test-as-hurdle-for-
welfare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Drug Testing and Public Assistance, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-
assistance.aspx (last updated Apr. 17, 2013) (providing a comprehensive survey of enacted or 
proposed drug testing legislation in the states). 
2 See, e.g., H.B. 208, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011) (establishing a substance 
screening program for adults who receive monetary public assistance, food stamps, or state medical 
assistance); S. 69, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (establishing a drug-testing 
requirement for adults who apply for need-based programs that provide cash assistance, medical 
assistance, housing assistance, food assistance, or energy assistance); H.R. 1174, 2012 Leg. Assemb., 
87th Sess. (S.D. 2012) (directing the South Dakota Department of Social Services to screen and test 
any adult recipient who is otherwise eligible for TANF or food stamps). 
3 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-294 (Supp. 2013) (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652 (West 
2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.57e (West 2008); 
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appeared in the United States Congress. At the federal level, the Middle Class Tax 
Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 authorizes states to condition unemployment 
benefits on passing a drug test and to deny unemployment benefits to anyone who 
fails a drug test.4 The Drug Free Families Act of 2011, presently stalled in the House 
and Senate, would require all fifty states to deny TANF assistance to anyone who 
tests positive for illegal drugs and to anyone convicted of a drug-related crime.5  
Although most states require a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before 
conducting a drug test, Florida and Georgia do not. Both states require a drug test for 
all TANF applicants irrespective of drug history or current suspicion of illegal drug 
use.6 In Florida, Governor Rick Scott has emphasized the unfairness of asking 
taxpayers to subsidize illegal drug use. In a statement to the press, Scott put it this 
way: “While there are certainly legitimate needs for public assistance, it is unfair for 
Florida taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction . . . . This new law will encourage 
personal accountability and will help to prevent the misuse of tax dollars.”7 In 
Missouri, Representative Ellen Brandom echoed Scott’s concerns: “We should 
discourage drug use and not reward it.”8 In another interview, she added: “Working 
people today work very hard to make ends meet, and it just doesn’t seem fair to them 
that their tax dollars go to support illegal things.”9  
While support for drug testing has largely focused on the unfairness of asking 
taxpayers to subsidize illegal drug use, supporters have also invoked other 
government interests in drug testing, including a state interest in providing an 
incentive for people to stop using drugs. In Georgia, the General Assembly has said 
that an important purpose of the drug testing law is to reduce the danger that 
children will be exposed to drugs in the home.10 Other states—including Alabama, 
Michigan and Oklahoma—have asserted a state interest in preventing drug-related 
child abuse, as well as a state interest in identifying TANF recipients for whom 
substance abuse might present a barrier to employment.11 In addition, both Florida 
and Georgia have asserted a state interest in not funding the public health and crime 
risks associated with drug use.12 In response, critics maintain that drug tests are 
needlessly intrusive and unfairly single out the poor for a drug test.13  
                                                                                                                 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.027 (West Supp. 2013); H.R. 2388, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012) (to 
be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 230, § 52); S. 2580, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012) (to 
be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-2); H.R. 155, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012) (to be 
codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-3-304.5).  
4 Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 2105, 2012 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (126 Stat.) 156, 162-63 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 305). 
5 Drug Free Families Act of 2011, S. 83, 112th Cong. § 2. 
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (West 2012). 
7 Press Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., Governor Scott Fulfills Campaign Promise to 
Require Drug Screening for Welfare Recipients (May 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.flgov.com/2011/06/03/governor-scott-fulfills-campaign-promise-to-require-drug-
screening-for-welfare-recipients/. 
8 Martin Karamra, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, CBS (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/04/13/drug-testing-welfare-recipients/. 
9 Sulzberger, supra note 1. 
10 GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (West 2012). 
11 Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski II), 309 F.3d 330, 333 (6th Cir. 2002); Brief of the 
States of Alabama, Kansas, Michigan & Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant & 
Reversal at 18, Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 11-15258). 
12 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652 (West 2013); S.B. 292, 158th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2012). 
13 See, e.g., Press Release, Alcee L. Hastings, Fla. Representative, Gov. Scott’s Targeting of 
Welfare Recipients for Drug Screening Misguided (May 31, 2011), available at 
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the United States Supreme Court has long 
held that a drug test constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.14 In the legal debate surrounding drug testing and public assistance, the 
central question is whether drug tests are unreasonable as a matter of constitutional 
law.15 Under the special needs doctrine, the Supreme Court has said that a drug test 
may be reasonable without an individualized suspicion of drug use when 
governments confront “special needs beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”16 In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court articulated a strong public 
safety rationale for the special needs doctrine. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the 
Supreme Court held that “where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,” 
suspicionless searches may be reasonable; however, where “public safety is not 
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search no 
matter how conveniently arranged.”17 Yet, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
strained to place the government interest in a suspicionless search within the scope 
of the public safety exception, while also suggesting that the special needs doctrine 
might encompass government interests beyond a government interest in public 
safety.18  
How should we think about this? In Populations, Public Health and the Law, 
legal scholar Wendy Parmet urges courts to embrace population-based legal 
analysis, a public health inspired approach to legal reasoning.19 Parmet contends that 
population-based legal analysis offers a way to analyze legal issues—not unlike law 
and economics—as well as a set of values from which to critique contemporary legal 
discourse.20 Population-based analysis has been warmly (and rightly) embraced by 
the health law community as a bold new way of analyzing legal issues.21 Still, 
population-based analysis is not without its problems. At times, Parmet claims too 
much territory for the population perspective. Moreover, Parmet urges courts to 
                                                                                                                 
http://alceehastings.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=327803 (quoting 
Congresswoman Corrine Brown who argues that drug tests for welfare recipients amount to “strip 
searching our state’s most vulnerable residents merely because they rely on the government for 
financial support during these difficult economic times”). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) 
(“We have long recognized that a compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for 
alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961) (applying the prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures to the states). 
15 Suspicionless drug tests implicate other constitutional rights, aside from the Fourth 
Amendment, including the right to privacy. However, courts have largely addressed suspicionless 
drug testing as a Fourth Amendment problem, and at times, an unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
problem. Therefore this Article will focus on the Fourth Amendment problems and unconstitutional 
conditions problems that arise when governments attempt to condition public assistance benefits on 
passing a drug test.  
16 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). 
17 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997). 
18 See discussion infra Part IV. 
19 WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 6 (2009). 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., RECONSIDERING LAW AND POLICY DEBATES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE (John 
G. Culhane ed., 2011); Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins, A Rightful Place for Public Health in 
American Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 302 (2002); Anthony Robbins, Public Health Literacy for 
Lawyers: Teaching Population-Based Legal Analysis, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 744 (2003); 
Jonathan E. Selkowitz, Comment, Guns, Public Nuisance, and the PLCAA: A Public Health-Inspired 
Legal Analysis of the Predicate Exception, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 793 (2011). 
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recognize population health as an important norm in legal reasoning. What should 
we do when the insights of public health and conventional legal reasoning conflict?  
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of state efforts to condition 
TANF and public assistance on passing a drug test. Part III outlines the fundamental 
elements of population-based legal analysis. Part IV discusses the evolution of the 
special needs doctrine, while also critiquing much of the doctrine from a public 
health perspective. Part V applies population-based legal analysis to the 
constitutional problems that arise when states condition public assistance benefits on 
passing a drug test, thereby highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of a 
population-based perspective. Part VI applies the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to drug testing of TANF and public assistance recipients, with special 
attention to how public health can add to our understanding of the unconstitutional 
conditions problem.  
II. TANF: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) 
and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).22 The 
overarching purpose of TANF is to move recipients of public assistance from 
welfare to work. With few exceptions, PRWORA requires TANF recipients to find 
at least part-time work within two years.23 PRWORA mandates at least twenty hours 
of work per week for parents with children over age six, and it also imposes a 
lifetime limit of no more than sixty months on the receipt of federal aid, with a state 
option for a shorter lifetime limit.24 States receive TANF block grants and are 
required to use those funds in a manner reasonably calculated to accomplish any one 
or more of the four TANF program goals: (i) assisting needy families so that 
children can be cared for in their homes; (ii) reducing the dependency of needy 
parents by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (iii) preventing out-of-
wedlock pregnancies; and (iv) encouraging the maintenance and formation of two-
parent families.25  
Federal and state laws limit TANF to low-income families in which the 
household includes a minor child or a pregnant woman.26 With few exceptions, 
qualified households must demonstrate that their total income is no more than 200% 
of the federal poverty level ($37,060 for a family of three in 2011, and $44,700 for a 
family of four).27 Although income assistance is one of the primary benefits of 
participation in TANF, the average monthly cash benefit varies widely from state to 
state. In 2011, this figure ranged from $753 for a single-parent family of three living 
in New York City to $170 in Mississippi.28 The average benefit for a single-parent 
family of three in 2011 was $303 in Florida and $280 in Georgia.29  
                                                
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2006). 
23 Id. § 602(a)(1)(ii). 
24 Id. §§ 607(c)(2)(B), 608(a)(7). 
25 Id. § 601(a). 
26 Id. § 608(a)(1). 
27 Id. § 604(3); 76 Fed. Reg. 3637, 3638 (Jan. 20, 2011).  
28 IFE FINCH & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF BENEFITS FELL 
FURTHER IN 2011 AND ARE WORTH MUCH LESS THAN IN 1996 IN MOST STATES 10 (2011), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3625. 
29 Id. 
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A. DRUG TESTING AND THE STATES  
1. Reasonable Suspicion  
PRWORA authorizes, but does not require, drug testing as a condition of 
assistance through TANF.30 In the handful of states that have enacted a drug testing 
requirement, most require “reasonable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” of drug use 
before conducting a drug test.31 In Arizona, TANF applicants are asked to complete 
a recent drug use questionnaire.32 Applicants who admit that they have used drugs 
are required to pass a urine test before receiving benefits.33 Those who fail the urine 
test are TANF-ineligible for one year.34 Not surprisingly, few applicants tend to 
disclose drug use. Since 2009, when drug testing began in Arizona, only 16 out of 
64,000 applicants have admitted drug use, and 931 applicants failed to submit the 
form.35  
Given the obvious limitations of screening by self-reporting, most states rely on 
case managers and substance abuse counselors to recognize the signs of drug use. In 
Missouri, the Department of Social Services screens TANF applicants and recipients 
for drug use and conducts a test when it has reasonable cause to suspect drug use.36 
Applicants or recipients who test positive for drugs are TANF-ineligible for a period 
of three years, unless they successfully complete a treatment program.37 In Missouri, 
TANF recipients who test positive for drugs have the option to retain their benefits 
on the condition that they enroll in a substance abuse treatment program for six 
months and do not test positive for drugs while participating in the program.38 
During that time, the Department of Social Services retains the right to conduct drug 
tests at random or for cause. If a person tests positive for drugs a second time, she is 
TANF-ineligible for three years.39  
2. Suspicionless Drug Testing  
In May 2011, the Florida State Legislature passed H.B. 353, a law that requires 
all new TANF applicants to pass a drug test before they qualify for benefits.40 Under 
H.B. 353, applicants who test positive for drugs are ineligible for TANF-funded cash 
assistance for one year following the date of a positive drug test.41 Applicants who 
test positive for drugs remain eligible for other TANF programs, including food 
stamps and child care.42 In Florida, TANF applicants bear the initial costs of their 
drug tests, which usually range from $25 to $45.43 Applicants who test negative for 
                                                
30 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be 
prohibited by the Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances 
nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances.”). 
31 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.027 (West Supp. 2013). 
32 Sulzberger, supra note 1. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.027. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652 (West 2013). 
41 Id. § 414.0652(1)(b). 
42 Id. § 414.0652(3)(a). 
43 Plaintiff-Appellee Luis W. Lebron’s Answer Brief at 11, Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 
1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 6:11–cv–01473–Orl–35DAB). 
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drugs receive a reimbursement through their initial TANF benefit.44 An applicant 
who tests positive for drugs can reapply for TANF benefits upon successful 
completion of a treatment program offered by a qualified provider.45 Persons who 
test positive for drugs a second time are TANF-ineligible for three years after the 
date of the second positive drug test.46 If TANF-eligible parents test positive for 
drugs, they can appoint a payee to receive benefits on behalf of their child.47  
Since Florida enacted H.B. 353, several others states have passed suspicionless 
drug testing requirements. In April 2012, the Georgia State Legislature adopted the 
Social Responsibility and Accountability Act.48 According to the Legislature, the 
purpose of the statute is to ensure that TANF funds are used for their intended 
purposes—to protect children from drug use in the home, and to assist adults who 
are addicted to drugs.49 Like H.B. 353, the Social Responsibility and Accountability 
Act directs Georgia’s Department of Human Services to administer a drug test to all 
TANF applicants, and to deem applicants who test positive for drugs ineligible for 
benefits.50 If applicants test positive, they are initially TANF-ineligible for one 
month, with increasing intervals of ineligibility following every subsequent positive 
drug test. Similarly, Tennessee and Oklahoma require a drug test when anyone 
applies for TANF.51  
III. POPULATION-BASED LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In a widely cited and influential report, the Institute of Medicine defined public 
health this way: “Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the 
conditions for people to be healthy.”52 In contrast to general medicine, public health 
concerns the health of populations rather than individuals. While traditional legal 
reasoning relies on non-empirical methods, such as analogical reasoning and 
statutory interpretation, public health values empirical analysis, often based on 
epidemiological data. From a public health perspective, the key questions in the 
debate surrounding drug testing and public assistance are these: What do we know 
about addiction? What do we know about the prevalence of illegal drug use in the 
target population? How will drug testing requirements impact the health of substance 
abusers and the people around them? 
Population-based legal analysis seeks to incorporate the principal concerns and 
methodologies of public health into legal reasoning.53 As advanced by Wendy 
Parmet, population-based legal analysis consists of three essential elements: (1) a 
population perspective derived from public health; (2) a normative valuation of 
population health; and (3) a combination of empirical and traditional legal 
reasoning.54 Fundamentally, population-based analysis concerns populations. Parmet 
writes: “From the population perspective, what matters most is the impact of a 
particular factor or agent (be it salmonella, a toxin, or even a legal policy) on a 
                                                
44 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(2)(a) (West 2013). 
45 Id. § 414.0652(2)(b).  
46 Id. § 414.0652(2)(h). 
47 Id. § 414.0652(3)(b). 
48 GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (West 2012). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. § 49-4-3.1(b). 
51 Id. § 49-4-3.1(f). 
52 INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1091. 
53 PARMET, supra note 19, at 6. 
54 Id. at 51-53. 
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definable group.”55 In a population-based analysis, a population consists of any 
number of individuals or groups of individuals who share a common trait, such as 
age, gender, or health status.56 Population-based analysis recognizes that populations 
are contingent and constructed; in doing so, Parmet challenges courts to grapple with 
the multiplicity of populations.57  
Second, as Parmet describes, population-based analysis understands the 
promotion of public health as an important legal norm:  
Borrowing from the population perspective, population-based legal 
analysis treats the promotion of public health as an important norm, 
but goes further and asserts that this good is both a rationale for law 
and a chief value of law. Hence it is a value that judges and lawyers 
should apply when they interpret legal texts and authority. Or, all other 
things being equal, legal decision makers should consider the 
promotion of population health as a relevant factor in their analysis.58  
As Parmet argues, societies establish laws in part to promote and preserve 
public health. Moreover, courts have long understood population health to be an 
important goal of law.59 For all of those reasons, Parmet contends that courts should 
view promoting public health as akin to other established norms of legal reasoning 
(such as the significance of judicial precedent and the neutrality of decision-
makers).60 Still, Parmet cautions that embracing population-based analysis does not 
mean that public health is the only or most important legal norm.61 Nor does it mean 
that courts should blindly defer to regulatory agencies who claim to act in the name 
of public health.62  
Third, population-based analysis incorporates empirical and probabilistic 
reasoning into legal analysis; however, doing so would require courts to do more 
than merely consider empirical evidence. In Parmet’s words, fusing the 
methodologies of law and public health would mean that “empirical and 
probabilistic reasoning joins analogical and deductive reasoning and other standard 
methods of legal interpretation . . . as among the ways that lawyers and the law come 
to know what is.”63 Parmet uses Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA—a case in 
which the Fifth Circuit struck down salmonella regulations—to illustrate 
probabilistic reasoning.64 The question before the court was whether meat containing 
salmonella should be considered “adulterated” within the meaning of the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act.65 As one might expect, the court conceptualized the issue 
before it in simple binary terms: either meat containing salmonella was adulterated 
within the meaning of the statute or it was not.66 Either the USDA had authority to 
regulate in this area or it did not. However, in doing so, Parmet argues that the Fifth 
                                                
55 Id. at 53. 
56 Id. at 18. 
57 Id. at 19.  
58 Id. at 56. 
59 Id. at 57. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 64. 
63 Id. at 53. 
64 Id. at 60-72 (discussing Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 275 F.3d 432 
(5th Cir. 2001), aff’g Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048 
(N.D. Tex. 2000)).  
65 PARMET, supra note 19, at 60-61. 
66 See id. at 60-62. 
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Circuit failed to recognize that risks are relative.67 The important issue was not 
merely a jurisdictional one that the court could address through textual interpretation 
and deductive reasoning. Rather, from a population perspective, the critical issues 
were how food borne illness might affect different populations and whether the risk 
of foodborne illness should be considered legally sufficient to justify USDA 
regulation.  
At times, however, Parmet claims too much territory for the population 
perspective. Consider Supreme Beef. Parmet asserts that had the Fifth Circuit applied 
a population perspective and appreciated public health as an appropriate legal norm, 
it would have read any ambiguity in the Federal Meat Inspection Act in light of its 
purpose, namely protecting consumer health and welfare.68 But why should we 
consider interpreting a statute in light of its purpose to be part of a population 
perspective? Parmet contends that insofar as public health is a goal of law, it is also 
a value that judges should apply when they interpret the law.69 Nonetheless, 
something can be a goal of law without also being a norm that should guide legal 
reasoning. Consider a law designed to promote diversity in higher education. Most 
of us would probably say that the government interest in diversity is relevant to 
disputes arising under that statute because the purpose of the statute is to promote 
diversity, not because diversity itself has role to play in legal reasoning. Diversity is 
only relevant insofar as it is the purpose of the statute. The same is true of public 
health.  
On the other hand, Parmet is quite right: too often, courts and legislatures 
invoke “public health talk” to justify policies post hoc, without carefully considering 
the actual health effects of those policies across populations.70 The special needs 
cases are replete with instances in which courts have invoked the rhetoric of public 
health or public safety without analyzing health risks. In that spirit, Part IV provides 
an overview of the special needs doctrine while also critiquing it from a public 
health perspective.  
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
The Supreme Court has long held that a drug test constitutes a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.71 But when does a search become unreasonable? 
The Fourth Amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.72 
One school of thought maintains that searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable unless supported by a warrant and probable cause, or one of a few 
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limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.73 For adherents to the warrant 
preference rule, individualized suspicion is a bedrock requirement of 
reasonableness.74 An alternative view maintains that the Warrant Clause and 
Reasonableness Clause are independent, and the Fourth Amendment contains “no 
irreducible requirement” of individualized suspicion.75 For proponents of the latter 
view, the ultimate measure of constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a government search depends on the 
totality of the circumstances.76  
For many years, a long line of Fourth Amendment cases held that a reasonable 
government search requires a warrant, probable cause or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.77 And yet, as Justice Scalia has observed, the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has “lurched back and forth between imposing a 
categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”78 To the 
regret of many Fourth Amendment scholars, the Court has begun to jettison the 
categorical protection of the warrant requirement in favor of a general 
reasonableness requirement.79 For now, however, the rule continues to be that a 
reasonable government search requires a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.80 Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has addressed government 
drug testing policies under the special needs exception to the warrant requirement. 
Part IV.A discusses the evolution of this doctrine.  
A. THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE  
The Supreme Court began to lay the groundwork for the special needs doctrine 
in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco.81 Camara began when housing 
inspectors entered Roland Camara’s apartment building to conduct a routine 
inspection of the building for violations of the city housing code. When inspectors 
asked Camara for permission to enter his apartment, Camara refused on the ground 
that the inspectors lacked a search warrant, and without probable cause to believe 
that a violation of the housing code existed, Camara insisted that the inspection 
would violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.82  
The Supreme Court held that housing safety inspections required a warrant; 
nonetheless, such inspections were not unreasonable for want of probable cause to 
believe that a particular dwelling contained violations of the housing code.83 To 
Justice White and members of the majority, the existence of probable cause 
depended on the reasonableness of the search. “In determining whether a particular 
inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to 
issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the inspection must be weighed in 
                                                
73 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness 
of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 523 (1995). 
74 See id. at 488. 
75 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
76 See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).  
77 THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 124 (2009). 
78 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991). 
79 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 197, 198-200 (1993). 
80 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
81 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
82 Id. at 527. 
83 Id. at 534.  
36 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 1 2014 
terms of the reasonable goals of code enforcement.”84 On one side of the balance 
were the interests of the government in identifying hazardous conditions that might 
present a danger to the public. On the other side of the balance were the individual 
interests in privacy. To the majority, suspicionless housing inspections involved a 
“relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”85 Housing inspections 
were not searches of the person, nor were they geared toward the discovery of 
criminal evidence.86 
Moreover, the government interest in public health and public safety justified a 
departure from probable cause based on indivudalized suspicion of wrongdoing:  
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect 
dwelling places . . . is of indispensable importance to the maintenance 
of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the 
blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of 
evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and 
city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to 
its health officials . . . .87 
Camara typifies the power of “public health talk,” employed by courts and 
appropriately denounced by Parmet. In Camara, the Court identified a government 
interest in preventing “even the unintentional development of conditions which are 
hazardous to public safety,” including faulty wiring and the risk of fire.88 Elsewhere 
Justice White alluded to the possibility that “fires and epidemics may ravage urban 
areas” as a justification for warrantless housing inspections.89 Yet, as health law 
scholar Lawrence Gostin writes, “if there is one article of faith in public health,” it is 
that public health regulation should be based on “risks that are significant, not 
speculative, theoretical or remote.”90 In Camara, the City failed to provide any 
evidence that faulty wiring presented a genuine public threat that would require 
warrantless housing inspections. Nor did the City demonstrate that its objectives 
could not be accomplished through less intrusive alternatives, for instance calling the 
fire department in response to an electrical fire. As such, Camara illustrates the 
tremendous deference that legislatures are sometimes granted when they claim to act 
in the name of public health, even without empirical evidence and even when doing 
so burdens fundamental rights, for example, the right to privacy in one’s home.  
The Supreme Court returned to the special needs doctrine several years later in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.91 T.L.O. began when a high school teacher discovered two girls 
smoking in a lavatory.92 When T.L.O. denied she had been smoking and claimed that 
she did not smoke at all, the vice principal demanded to search her purse.93 Upon 
opening T.L.O.’s purse, he observed further evidence of drug use: a small amount of 
marijuana, empty plastic bags, several one-dollar bills, and an index card listing the 
names of students who owed T.L.O. money.94 The vice principal turned the evidence 
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over to the police, and T.L.O confessed that she had been selling drugs at school.95 
T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the vice principal 
proceeded without probable cause, and the warrantless search of her purse violated 
the Fourth Amendment.96  
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that the search of 
T.L.O.’s purse was not unreasonable. Once again Justice White explained that the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and whether a search is 
reasonable depends on both the context in which it takes place and balancing 
interests at stake.97 Striking the balance in favor of schools, the Court concluded that 
a warrant requirement would “frustrate” the school’s interest in maintaining swift 
discipline.98 Nor would a valid Fourth Amendment search require probable cause.99 
The report that T.L.O. had been smoking in the restroom was enough to provide the 
vice principal with a “reasonable suspicion” that her purse contained cigarettes, and 
thereby render the search of T.L.O.’s purse consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.100 Citing Terry v. Ohio, Justice White suggested that a “reasonable 
suspicion” of wrongdoing is a lower standard than probable cause but more than an 
inchoate suspicion or “hunch.”101 Instead, a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing 
requires “specific and articulable facts.”102  
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence to underscore that while the 
Court had recognized limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement, it had 
done so only when confronted with a “special need” for greater governmental 
flexibility: “Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause 
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Framers.”103 According to Justice Blackmun, the Framers had already balanced the 
interests at stake and decided that a search is unreasonable unless supported by a 
warrant and probable cause.104 Only when the warrant and probable cause 
requirements are impractical are courts permitted to substitute their judgment for 
that of the Framers.105 To Justice Blackmun, elementary and secondary schools 
presented a quintessential need for greater governmental flexibility—teachers cannot 
maintain discipline if they are required to obtain a warrant before searching a 
student, nor can teachers be expected to make on-the-spot decisions about probable 
cause.106 
Following T.L.O., the Court invoked the special needs doctrine in O’Connor v. 
Ortega107 and Griffin v. Wisconsin.108 In Ortega, a plurality of Justices held that it 
was not unreasonable for a hospital investigative team to enter the office of a public 
employee and seize several items from his desk without a warrant and without 
probable cause. The plurality reasoned that “special needs, beyond the normal need 
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for law enforcement” would make the warrant and probable cause requirements 
impracticable when government employers investigate office misconduct.109 
Although public employees do not lose their Fourth Amendment rights merely 
because they work for the government instead of a private employer, “the 
operational realities of the workplace” can make some expectations of privacy 
unreasonable.110 Requiring employers to secure a warrant in order to search an 
employee’s office for evidence of workplace misconduct would be unduly 
burdensome.111 Moreover, if employers were required to establish probable cause 
before conducting an investigation, the delays could result in “irreparable damage” 
to the public interest.112  
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that permitted 
probation officers to search the home of a probationer without a warrant, as long as 
the officers had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the search would reveal 
contraband.113 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that states 
have a “special need” to supervise probationers, and that the officers’ tip provided 
reasonable grounds for the search. Importantly, the Supreme Court invoked the 
rhetoric of public health in Griffin, just as it invoked public health twenty years 
earlier in Camara. According to the Court, the purpose of the statute at issue in 
Griffin was to ensure that “probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation.”114 
Moreover, probation officers were employees of the Wisconsin Department of 
Health and Social Services who were required to provide counseling with the 
wellbeing of their “client” in mind.115 Thus, the Court suggested that the clinical 
goals of probation provided further justification for a warrantless search.  
In T.L.O., Ortega, and Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld searches of property 
based on a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Association and its companion case National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court turned its attention to drug tests conducted without 
a suspicion of drug use. In Skinner, the Court upheld regulations promulgated by the 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that required drug and alcohol testing for 
railroad employees who were involved in a major train accident without a warrant 
and without suspicion that a particular employee might have been intoxicated.116 The 
Court reasoned that, not unlike the government interest in maintaining discipline in 
schools or supervising probationers, the government interest in regulating the 
conduct of railroad employees constitutes a special need beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement.117 The FRA was able to provide extensive evidence that workplace 
intoxication was a serious problem in the railroad industry.118 The FRA was also 
able to provide evidence that railroads were only able to detect a small number of 
violations when they relied on supervisors to observe employees in the past.119  
Nor did the Court find the federal regulations unreasonable for lack of 
individualized suspicion. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy underscored that 
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while the Supreme Court usually required some measure of individualized suspicion 
before conducting a search, “a showing of individualized suspicion is not a 
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.”120 
Federal regulations did not require employees to furnish samples under direct 
observation, and railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy by 
virtue of their participation in an industry that is heavily regulated to ensure 
safety.121  
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulations that required a drug 
test for all employees in the United States Customs Service who applied for a 
position that involved the interdiction of illegal drugs or that required employees to 
carry a firearm or handle classified materials.122 In contrast to the Federal Railroad 
Administration, however, the Customs Service was unable to provide any evidence 
that illegal drug use was a serious problem among its employees. Yet to describe the 
drug testing program as unreasonable given the lack of evidence regarding a drug 
problem was, for Justice Kennedy, “an unduly narrow view of the context in which 
the Service’s testing program took place.”123 Instead the Court alluded to the 
national war on drugs: “The Customs Service is our Nation’s first line of defense 
against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
population. We have adverted before to the veritable national crisis in law 
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.”124 To that end, the Court 
characterized the government interest as “compelling.”125 The Court also held that 
customs agents on the frontlines of drug interdiction have a diminished expectation 
of privacy.126 Given the “extraordinary safety and national security hazards” that 
would arise if the Customs Service were to promote illegal drug users to positions 
that required them to carry a firearm or interdict controlled substances, the drug 
testing policy was not unreasonable.127  
What should we say about Von Raab from a public health or population 
perspective? On one hand, the reasoning in Von Raab is clearly inconsistent with 
population-based analysis and its demand for empirical evidence. Notwithstanding 
the fears expressed by Justice Kennedy and members of the majority, the probability 
of illicit drug use among customs agents was exceptionally low. Of the 3,600 
customs employees who were tested for drugs, only 5 employees—less than 1/10 of 
1%—tested positive.128 Given the extraordinarily low prevalence of illegal drug use 
among customs agents, fears that the country might face “extraordinary safety and 
national security hazards” without suspicionless drug tests were vastly overblown.129 
On the other hand, to characterize the demand for empirical evidence as “taking a 
population perspective,” as Parmet often does,130 is to claim too much territory for 
population-based analysis. We could just as easily imagine the Court concluding that 
the Customs Service failed to establish a genuine national security hazard within the 
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parameters of conventional legal reasoning. A defender of Parmet and population-
based analysis might respond that Parmet does not characterize the demand for 
empirical evidence as sui generis of the population perspective. Indeed, she writes: 
“Population-based legal analysis adopts the methodologies of public health. This 
does not simply mean that consideration is given to empirical evidence; courts have 
been doing that for a long, long time.”131 Notwithstanding these disclaimers, 
however, Parmet often faults the Supreme Court for failing to “truly embrace a 
population perspective”132 and accepting public health arguments without any 
empirical support. In doing so, she implies that a rigorous examination of empirical 
evidence is in fact a central element of population-based analysis.  
The Supreme Court revisited suspicionless drug testing several years later in the 
context of public schools. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme 
Court upheld a policy that required student athletes to submit to random drug testing 
as a condition of participation in interscholastic athletics.133 The school district 
implemented the policy in response to a noticeable increase in drug use and 
disciplinary problems among students, particularly student athletes.134 Based on 
testimony from teachers and school administrators, the district court found, and 
Supreme Court accepted, that “‘a large segment of the student body, particularly 
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,’ [and] that 
‘[d]isciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions’. . . .”135 Not only would 
drug use increase the risk of sports-related injury, but school administrators feared 
that in their small community on the edge of town, drug use by student athletes 
could also create a “role model effect,” thereby fueling drug use among other 
students.136  
Subsequently, the Court held that drug testing was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances, even without individualized suspicion of illegal drug use. The Court, 
per Justice Scalia, asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not impose an 
“irreducible requirement” of individualized suspicion.137 Instead, the ultimate 
measure of constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.138 
Justice Scalia noted that in contrast to members of the general public, schoolchildren 
are required to submit to routine screenings, vaccinations, and physical exams; 
therefore, children have a diminished expectation of privacy within the school 
environment.139 Moreover, “[b]y choosing to go out for the team,” student athletes 
“voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that 
imposed on students generally.”140  
In 1997, after an uninterrupted line of cases upholding searches under the 
special needs doctrine, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that required 
candidates for public office to pass a drug test as a condition of placement on the 
state ballot in Chandler v. Miller.141 In support of the certification requirement, 
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Georgia asserted a state interest in ensuring fitness for public office.142 The 
government also argued that illegal drug use would undermine public confidence in 
elected officials and compromise the ability of elected officials to discharge their 
public functions, particularly their ability to enforce anti-drug laws.143  
In an 8-1 opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg held that Georgia’s certification 
requirement did not fit within the “closely guarded category” of permissible 
suspicionless searches.144 Notably, the government’s case lacked “any indication of a 
concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s main rule.”145 
While evidence of a concrete danger was not indispensable given Von Raab, 
evidence of a genuine problem would at least “shore up” the assertion of a special 
need.146 “What is left,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “is the image the State seeks to 
project. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to a drug test, Georgia 
displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse.”147 However, the state’s 
interest in setting an example is more “symbolic” than substantial within the 
meaning of the special needs doctrine.148 In Chandler, the Court defined the term 
“substantial” as a government interest that is both “important enough to override the 
individual interest in privacy” and “sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”149 The Court also 
indicated that in order to be reasonable, a suspicionless search requires evidence of a 
genuine threat to public safety:  
We reiterate too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and 
real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 
“reasonable”—for example, searches now routine at airports . . . . But 
where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the 
Fourth Amendment precludes suspicionless searches no matter how 
conveniently arranged.150   
Five years later, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court struck 
down a state statute that authorized drug tests for maternity patients suspected of 
cocaine use without the patient’s consent and without a warrant.151 Hospital 
administrators, police officers, and local officials crafted the policy in response to a 
noticeable increase in cocaine use among patients who were receiving prenatal 
treatment.152 Patients who tested positive for cocaine were referred to a substance 
abuse clinic for treatment.153 If patients tested positive a second time, or if they 
missed an appointment with a substance abuse counselor, the police were notified 
immediately and the patients were arrested.154 The government conceded that the 
threat of law enforcement allowed the hospital to leverage patients into treatment; 
however, the government defended the policy on special needs grounds.155 Even if 
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the policy incorporated the threat of law enforcement, the policy was ultimately 
designed to serve non-law enforcement ends, namely protecting pregnant women 
and their children.156 In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the 
searches were unreasonable because they were “ultimately indistinguishable from 
the general interest in crime control.”157 Even if the ultimate goal had been to get 
women into substance abuse treatment, the extensive involvement of law 
enforcement in the development of the program, and its day-to-day administration, 
suggested that “the immediate objective” of the program was to secure evidence for 
a criminal proceeding.158  
Since Chandler, it now appears that at least a handful of Justices have retreated 
from a strong public safety rationale for the special needs doctrine. In Board of 
Education v. Earls, the most recent special needs case, a four-justice plurality 
described public safety as only a “factor” in a special needs analysis.159 In Earls, the 
plurality upheld a policy that required all middle and high school students to consent 
to an initial drug test, as well as random drug testing and testing on reasonable 
suspicion, as a condition of participation in any extracurricular activity.160 While the 
policy upheld in Vernonia only applied to student athletes, the policy at issue in 
Earls required drug testing for students who participated in any extracurricular 
activity, including nonathletic activities such as Future Farmers of America, the 
Academic Team, the show choir or the marching band.161 In an opinion by Justice 
Thomas, the plurality held that the school policy was not unreasonable, even without 
evidence that illegal drug use was a serious problem in Pottawatomie schools.162 
Justice Thomas reiterated that public schoolchildren have only a diminished 
expectation of privacy, and the government had a strong interest in eliminating drug 
use, particularly among schoolchildren.163  
1. Public Assistance and the Fourth Amendment  
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutional questions that arise 
when states condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test. In Wyman v. 
James, however, the Supreme Court upheld a similar provision that required Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients to accept scheduled home 
visits by a caseworker as a condition of receiving benefits.164 In Wyman, the Court 
held that home visits by an AFDC caseworker were not searches within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, and even if they were, home visits were not 
unreasonable.165 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun reasoned that when states 
distribute federal and state tax dollars through their social welfare programs, they are 
“fulfilling a public trust,” and as such, states have an “appropriate and paramount 
interest” in ensuring that public dollars reach their intended beneficiaries.166 
Moreover, the reasonableness of the government’s interests, as well as the voluntary 
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nature of applying for AFDC, worked together to diminish the privacy rights of Mrs. 
James.167  
a. Lower Court Decisions  
Despite Wyman, lower courts have consistently invalidated efforts to condition 
public assistance on passing a drug test. In Marchwinski v. Howard, a federal district 
court struck down a pilot program that authorized random suspicionless drug testing 
for all TANF recipients in Michigan.168 Under the pilot program, TANF recipients 
who tested positive for a controlled substance in selected counties were required to 
participate in a substance abuse treatment program or risk losing their benefits.169 In 
support of the program, Michigan asserted a state interest in moving TANF 
recipients from welfare to work, as well as a state interest in protecting children 
from abuse and neglect in the homes of TANF recipients.170 Relying heavily on 
Chandler, the district court held that the state interest in identifying potential 
barriers to employment does not constitute a special need.171 The district court heard 
arguments for Marchwinski before Earls. Without Earls, the district court read 
Chandler to limit the special needs doctrine to circumstances in which states are 
faced with a genuine threat to public safety.172 In addition, the district court was not 
persuaded that a state interest in preventing child abuse and neglect constituted a 
special need. Instead, the court reasoned that insofar as the TANF program was not 
designed to address child abuse and neglect, the state could not advance these 
interests as a special need.173  
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the 
district court erred in holding that only a public safety interest can qualify as a 
special need.174 Instead, the proper standard should have been whether the State of 
Michigan demonstrated a special need “of which public safety is but one 
consideration.”175 Given Earls, the court readily concluded that suspicionless drug 
testing would advance a host of state interests, both related and unrelated to public 
safety:  
We think it is beyond cavil that the state has a special need to insure 
that public moneys expended in the [TANF program] are used by 
recipients for their intended purposes and not for procuring controlled 
substances—a criminal activity that not only undermines the objectives 
of the program but directly endangers both the public and the children 
the program is designed to assist.176  
The court noted additional public safety interests, including a state interest in 
protecting children in the TANF program from child abuse as well as a state interest 
in protecting the public from crime associated with drug trafficking.177 A year later, 
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however, the Sixth Circuit agreed to rehear Marchwinski en banc.178 On appeal, the 
full 12-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit deadlocked on the Fourth Amendment issue, 
6-6.179 As a result, the appellate court affirmed the initial district court opinion, 
thereby striking down drug testing for TANF applicants in Michigan.180  
In Lebron v. Wilkins, a Florida district court issued a preliminary injunction 
against the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF), temporarily halting 
the Department’s ability to condition TANF benefits on a suspicionless drug test.181 
In its defense, the State argued that drug testing TANF applicants furthered a 
number of state interests, foremost among them a state interest in ensuring that 
public funds reach their intended beneficiaries.182 Second, by providing low-income 
children with cash assistance, the State stepped into the role of economic provider, 
thereby acquiring a duty to protect minor children from drug abuse in the home.183 
Third, a drug testing requirement would allow DCF to identify drug-related barriers 
to employment, thereby furthering the overarching mission of TANF—economic 
self-sufficiency.184 Fourth, due to the “public health” and “crime risks” associated 
with illegal drug use, the State asserted a paramount interest in not funding the drug 
epidemic and its associated “public ills.”185  
The district court rejected each of those claims, primarily on the ground that the 
State failed to provide concrete evidence of rampant illegal drug use among TANF 
recipients in Florida.186 Well before enacting H.B. 353, the Florida Legislature 
directed the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) to conduct a pilot 
study to determine whether TANF applicants were more likely to abuse drugs, and 
whether that abuse impacted employment and their use of social services.187 The 
pilot study found that roughly 5% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs, a 
rate far less than the prevalence of statewide drug use in Florida, estimated at 
8.13%.188 Moreover, those who tested positive for drugs during the pilot study were 
just as likely to work and just as likely to use social services as those who tested 
negative for drugs.189 Second, between July 2011 and November 2011, when drug 
testing began, only 2% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs.190 Nor was the 
court persuaded that refusal to take a drug test after being deemed otherwise eligible 
should be considered a “drug related denial,” since there were any number of 
reasons that a person might refuse a drug test—inability to pay for testing or lack of 
transportation—and the State was unable to provide any evidence about why 
applicants failed to take a drug test.191 Finally, the district court rejected the State’s 
contention that data on the nationwide prevalence of drug use might have any 
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probative value on the question before the court—namely the prevalence of illegal 
drug use among TANF applicants in Florida.192 Applying the Chandler “concrete 
danger” rule, the court concluded that Florida failed to provide evidence of a 
“concrete danger” among the class of citizens it sought to test.193 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 
preliminary injunction.194 On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court 
declared H.B. 353 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined Florida from 
reinstating the drug testing requirement.195 In Florida, Governor Rick Scott has 
vowed to appeal the Eleventh Circuit decision to the Supreme Court.196  
Lebron aptly illustrates Wendy Parmet’s contention that even when courts 
consider empirical evidence, they often fail to reason empirically and 
probabilistically. The district court faulted Florida for relying on national estimates 
of illegal drug use and failing to provide robust Florida-specific evidence about the 
prevalence of drug use among TANF applicants.197 However, from a public health 
perspective, what we want to know is whether findings based on national household 
surveys of illegal drug use are generalizable to Florida. Part V.A below demonstrates 
that basic principles of risk assessment and epidemiology can help courts determine 
whether states have met their burden to establish a genuine threat to public safety.  
V. THE LIMITS OF POPULATION-BASED LEGAL ANALYSIS  
Part V applies population-based analysis to the constitutional problems that 
arise when states condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test. Part V 
also contrasts population-based analysis with a conventional application of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the population 
perspective. To that end, Part V.A presents a simple public-health inspired 
framework for risk analysis, while also criticizing the reasoning in Lebron from a 
public health perspective. Part V.B. turns to the nature and intrusiveness of a special 
needs search. From a conventional Fourth Amendment perspective, questions about 
the intrusiveness of a search concern who will receive test results, whether positive 
tests will be turned over to law enforcement, and ultimately, whether the search falls 
within the scope of the special needs doctrine. From a public health perspective, 
however, we can understand sharing positive drug test results with law enforcement 
as a risk-risk tradeoff. Drug testing requirements and information sharing between 
state agencies would probably deter people who use illegal drugs from seeking 
public assistance. On the other hand, states could also increase the risk that children 
who are in abusive homes will go undetected. Still, the unanswered question for 
population-based analysis is this—what legal significance, if any, should courts 
attach to these insights? 
Since Vernonia, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed effectiveness as an 
element of a reasonable special needs search.198 Yet courts tend to assume that drug 
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tests are reasonably likely to accomplish their objectives.199 Instead, Part V.C will 
argue that courts should assume a more aggressive posture when evaluating the 
effectiveness of a search under the special needs doctrine.  
Once again the problem for population-based analysis is plain—what should we 
do when the insights of public health and conventional legal reasoning conflict? 
Requiring public assistance recipients to pass a drug test might be eminently 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment yet a horrible idea from a 
public health perspective. Setting these concerns aside, Part V.C argues that the 
current approach to the special needs doctrine is faulty in one further respect: the 
failure to incorporate the least intrusive alternative requirement into the special 
needs doctrine. Although the Supreme Court has consistently said that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require governments to adopt the least intrusive means to 
accomplish their objectives, without incorporating the least intrusive alternative 
requirement into the special needs doctrine, special needs searches are needlessly 
over-inclusive.  
Part V.D considers the individual interest in privacy. Courts may well conclude 
that the privacy interests implicated by suspicionless drug tests are negligible. 
However, Part V.D will show that suspicionless drug tests implicate more than the 
individual interest in privacy. A large body of social epidemiology literature has 
shown that encounters with the law can be a powerful marker of social status with 
implications for our health.  
A. THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST  
In Chandler, the Supreme Court held that a lawful suspicionless search requires 
a genuine threat to public safety: “We reiterate, too, that where the risk to the public 
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk 
may rank as ‘reasonable’. . . . But where . . . public safety is not genuinely in 
jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how 
conveniently arranged.”200 Yet how can we know whether threats to public safety are 
substantial or real? From a public health perspective, we can understand risk as a 
composite of two factors—the probability of the harm and the magnitude of the 
harm if it were to occur. By probability of the harm, I mean the probability that an 
adverse event such as illegal drug use will occur. By magnitude of the harm, I mean 
the nature and severity of the harm if it were to occur. In the latter category, I will 
include harms associated with illegal drug use such as the misuse of taxpayer dollars 
to purchase illegal drugs, harms to drug users themselves, and harms to others such 
as child abuse and neglect.  
1. The Probability of the Harm  
a. National Estimates  
Most nationally representative estimates of illegal drug use in the United States 
have found that roughly one in five TANF recipients reported illegal drug use at 
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some point during the past year. 201 These findings also appear to be consistent over 
time. Using 1994-1995 data from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse 
(NHSDA), Jayakody and colleagues found that 21% of welfare recipients who 
received cash assistance reported use of an illegal drug during the past year, 
compared to 13% of non-recipients.202 Excluding marijuana, about 10% of welfare 
recipients reported use of some other illegal drug during the past year, compared to 
7% of non-recipients, however, as the researchers caution these differences were not 
statistically significant.203 Similarly, using 2002 data from the National Survey of 
Drug Use and Health—the successor to the NHSDA—Pollack and colleagues found 
that 22.3% of women TANF recipients aged 18-49 reported using illegal drug use 
during the previous year compared to 12.8% of women who did not receive TANF 
benefits.204  
Still, as opponents of drug testing will argue, not all studies based on nationally 
representative data suggest that one in five recipients of public assistance uses illegal 
drugs. In 2002, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) reported that the prevalence of past-month illicit drug use among people 
in households receiving cash assistance through TANF was somewhat higher than 
the prevalence of drug use among non-recipients: 11.5% compared to 6.8%.205 Nor 
did the study find twofold gaps in the prevalence of illegal drug use among 
recipients of public assistance. The prevalence of past-month illicit drug use among 
recipients of public assistance—not limited to TANF—was somewhat higher, 
though not by much: 9.6% compared to 6.8%.206 
b. State Estimates  
For opponents of drug testing, findings from state experiments with drug testing 
also cast doubt on claims that roughly one in five TANF recipients use illegal drugs. 
In October 1999, Michigan implemented mandatory drug testing for TANF 
recipients.207 Under the statute, all TANF recipients were required to pass a urine 
test as a condition of assistance.208 Between October and November, when drug 
testing ended under an injunction, 258 TANF recipients were tested for drugs.209 Of 
those 258 recipients, 21 (8.1%) tested positive.210 Of those who tested positive, 18 
(7.0%) tested positive for marijuana alone, and 3 (1.2%) tested positive for “hard 
drugs,” including cocaine and amphetamine.211 The rate of illegal drug use detected 
among TANF recipients in Michigan was also comparable to the 1999 prevalence of 
                                                
201 Lisa A. Metsch & Harold A. Pollack, Welfare Reform and Substance Abuse, 83 MILBANK Q. 
65, 68 (2005). 
202 Rukmalie Jayakody et al., Welfare Reform, Substance Use, and Mental Health, 25 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 623, 636-38 (2000). 
203 Id. at 637-38. 
204 Harold A. Pollack et al., Drug Testing Welfare Recipients—False Positives, False Negatives, 
Unanticipated Opportunities, 12 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 23 (2002).  
205 OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 
SUBSTANCE USE AMONG PERSONS IN FAMILIES RECEIVING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 2 tbl.1 (2002), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k2/GovAid/GovAid.htm. 
206 Id. 
207 Metsch & Pollack, supra note 201, at 76. 
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 Id. 
211 Id.  
48 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 1 2014 
drug use within the state population as a whole (7.1%), leading opponents to argue 
that states like Michigan are wrongly singling TANF recipients out for drug tests.212  
What should we make of these claims? First, we might worry that findings from 
states like Michigan fail to provide a valid estimate of drug use among TANF 
recipients. Since drug testing proposals are well advertised, opponents of drug 
testing cannot rule out the possibility that although most TANF recipients do not use 
drugs, those who do use illegal drugs either refrained from doing so prior to taking 
the test, or simply elected not to apply for benefits. In Florida, the H.B. 353 pilot 
study found that 5% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs; however, as the 
researchers readily concede, the study suffered from a number of methodological 
problems.213 In addition to a possible deterrent effect from advertising, only those 
applicants who were predicted to have a substance abuse problem using the 
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSI) were asked to take a drug test 
during the pilot study.214 A false negative rate of 7% would mean that the SASSI 
failed to identify 335 individuals as potential candidates for a drug test; however, 
since the SASSI screens for both alcohol and drug abuse, we cannot know how 
many of those 335 individuals might have tested positive for drugs.215  
In Lebron, the district court concluded that Florida could only provide evidence 
that somewhere between 2% and 5% of TANF applicants have used illegal drugs, 
and therefore the government failed to demonstrate a “concrete danger” of illegal 
drug use among TANF recipients.216 Due to enrollment bias and deterrent effects, 
however, findings from pilot studies and early testing probably underestimate the 
actual prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF applicants in Florida. Even if the 
prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF applicants in Florida is not as high as 
11% or 20%, it seems unlikely that only 2% or 5% of TANF recipients have used 
illegal drugs, a rate far below the state average of roughly 8%.217  
In Lebron the district court also faulted Florida for relying on national estimates 
of illegal drug use and failing to provide evidence about the prevalence of drug use 
among TANF applicants in Florida.218 However, from a public health perspective, 
what we want to know is whether findings based on national household surveys of 
illegal drug use are generalizable to Florida. John Monahan and Laurens Walker 
have shown that questions about generalizability in social science bear a close 
resemblance to reasoning by analogy in the law.219 Just as courts will view 
precedents as “on point” to the extent that they involve similar facts, questions about 
external validity or generalizability concern the degree of similarity between the 
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people under study and the people to whom courts wish to generalize.220 Moreover, 
just as courts should not rely on decisions that are poorly reasoned, or decisions that 
have fallen into disfavor, courts should only rely on a particular piece of scientific 
evidence to the extent that it has survived the process of peer review, it has 
employed valid research methods, and it is supported by further research.221  
Despite being a coastal state and an entry point for drug smuggling into the 
United States, illicit drug use in Florida closely resembles the national average. 
According to the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 8.84% of 
Floridians age twelve or older reported use of an illicit drug during the past month, 
compared to a national average of 8.3%.222 Using data from the same survey, Pollack 
and colleagues found that roughly 20% of TANF recipients reported illicit drug use 
during the past year.223 Based on this evidence we can infer that the prevalence of 
past year illegal drug use among TANF recipients in Florida is probably somewhere 
around 20%. However, even if the prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF 
recipients is roughly 20%, that would mean that 80% of TANF recipients have not 
reported illegal drug use; yet, as the district court pointed out in Lebron, all are 
required to submit to a drug test.224  
c. A Precautionary Principle?  
 In Lebron, Florida argued that it could establish a special governmental need 
for drug testing without evidence of an “overwhelming drug problem.”225 In support 
of its contention, the government relied heavily on Von Raab, where the Supreme 
Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for customs agents involved in drug 
interdiction without any evidence that illegal drug use was a serious problem among 
customs agents.226 The government also alluded to Earls, where a plurality of the 
Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for high school students involved in 
nonathletic extracurricular activities, again with very little evidence of illegal drug 
use among these students, but instead on the ground that illegal drug use presents a 
safety risk for all children, “athletes and nonathletes alike.”227 Writing for the 
plurality in Earls, Justice Thomas reasoned, “it would make little sense to require a 
school district to wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs 
before it was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug 
use.”228  
What should we make of these claims? As Lawrence Gostin writes, “if there is 
one article of faith in public health,” it is that public health regulation should be 
based on “risks that are significant, not speculative, theoretical, or remote.”229 
Without a clear understanding of a public health hazard, interventions are unlikely to 
be effective and run a risk of imposing needless economic costs and personal 
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burdens.230 At the same time, communities will sometimes face hazards that are not 
fully understood but nonetheless require immediate intervention.231 In public health, 
the precautionary principle provides a framework for preventive measures designed 
to protect the public’s health under conditions of uncertainty.232 It permits 
policymakers to implement regulation when there are early warning signs that a 
harm is occurring or is likely to occur, even though the precise causal mechanisms 
of that harm are not yet fully understood.233 In environmental health, the 
precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof onto proponents of an activity to 
demonstrate that the proposed activity would not result in a serious or potentially 
irreversible harm.234 Absent such evidence, the precautionary principle permits 
preventive regulation geared toward protecting public health. In support of greater 
precautionary measures, proponents of the precautionary principle often cite 
examples of risks that were underestimated but later turned out to be highly 
damaging to human health, including asbestos, leaded gasoline, and 
chlorofluorocarbons.235  
What would the precautionary principle imply for the special needs doctrine? 
Ordinarily, a reasonable government search requires a warrant; without one, a search 
requires probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, as 
Justice Kennedy observed in Von Raab, the traditional probable cause standard may 
be unhelpful when “the Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous 
conditions” or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for a 
search.236 We can understand the special needs doctrine as an attempt to organize the 
murky territory between searches falling short of probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion but above the Fourth Amendment threshold of unreasonableness.  
Although the Supreme Court has been criticized for failing to recognize the 
many ways in which the law can be used as a tool to protect population health, in its 
special needs cases, the Supreme Court appears to have the opposite problem—a 
tendency to be overly solicitous when governments assert an interest in public health 
or public safety. A tendency to overemphasize small risks to public health led the 
Court to uphold suspicionless fire safety inspections for householders in Camara, 
and suspicionless drug tests for customs agents in Von Raab.237 Before pressing on 
to consider what the precautionary principle might imply for drug testing and public 
assistance, it may be helpful to pause and reconsider the drug testing cases from a 
public health perspective.  
                                                
230 See id.  
231 Id.  
232 The precautionary principle has its origins in environmental health. A widely cited 
formulation of the precautionary principle can be found in the 1992 United Nations Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development. Id. at 72. As formulated in the Declaration and adopted by member 
states, including the United States, the precautionary principle provides, “[w]here there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de Janiero, Braz., Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), Annex I (Aug. 
12, 1992). 
233 Joel A. Tickner et al., A Compass for Health: Rethinking Precaution and Its Role in Science 
and Public Health, 32 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 489, 489 (2003). 
234 Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle From Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2011). 
235 Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the 
Precautionary Principle, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 1799, 1799 (2003). 
236 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (emphasis in original). 
237 Id. 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, DRUG TESTING, AND THE LAW 51 
 
 
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court emphasized the “extraordinary safety and 
national security hazards” associated with the promotion of illegal drug users to 
positions involving drug interdiction or to positions that would require them to carry 
firearms.238 However, the case for precautionary measures fails in Von Raab, owing 
to the low risk harm. Above, I said that we can understand risk as a combination of 
two factors—the probability of a harm and the magnitude of the harm if it were to 
occur.239 Notwithstanding routine exposure to criminal elements and access to 
valuable sources of contraband, only slightly more than one-tenth of one percent of 
customs employees tested positive for illegal drugs.240  
By itself, a low probability of harm should not lead courts to conclude that the 
government has failed to establish a genuine public health threat. Courts must also 
consider the severity of the harm if it were to occur. Although the number of airline 
passengers and pieces of luggage screened by the Federal Aviation Administration 
reaches into the billions, only a few thousand firearms have been detected and only a 
few planes have been successfully hijacked.241 Even though the probability of an 
undetected firearm or a successful hijacking is extraordinarily low, the consequences 
of a false negative (a missed firearm or a successful hijacking) would be very 
severe—hundreds of human lives lost, countless injuries, and millions of dollars in 
property damage. In cases like this one, where the severity of harm is great because 
of long-lasting and potentially devastating consequences across populations, 
governments can establish genuine threats to public safety notwithstanding a low 
probability of wrongdoing. By contrast, the harm associated with failure to interdict 
a drug shipment is fairly low— primarily drug-related morbidity and some mortality. 
The combination of a near zero probability of harm and the small magnitude of harm 
greatly undermines the case for precautionary drug testing.  
The case for precautionary measures becomes stronger in Vernonia where the 
government was able to provide a wealth of evidence to support its claims regarding 
the extent of illegal drug use in Vernonia schools. Students began to boast about 
drug use and the inability of school administrators to stop them; teachers reported 
direct observation of student drug use and confiscated drug paraphernalia on school 
grounds.242 Coaches also reported an increase in the number and severity of 
injuries.243 In contrast to Von Raab, where the connection between drug use and 
population health was highly attenuated and speculative at best, in Vernonia the 
government was able to advance a plausible hypothesis that in a small community 
where interscholastic activities provided the primary source of entertainment, drug 
use among student athletes could fuel a “role model” effect, encouraging other 
students to use drugs.244 School administrators were able to provide credible 
evidence that the combination of illegal drug use and exercise could result in serious, 
potentially deadly harms.245  
In contrast to Vernonia, the case for precaution fails entirely in Earls. School 
administrators were only able to provide minimal evidence of illegal drug use, 
primarily: (1)testimony from teachers who had observed students who appeared to 
be under the influence of drugs; (2) marijuana cigarettes in the school parking lot; 
                                                
238 Id. at 674. 
239 See supra Part V.A.  
240 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673.  
241 Id. at 675 n.3. 
242 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995). 
243 Id. at 649.  
244 Id. at 663.  
245 Id. at 662. 
52 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 1 2014 
and (3) drug paraphernalia found in a car driven by a student member of the Future 
Farmers of America.246 Nor was the government able to provide much in the way of 
a causal connection between illegal drug use and harm.247 Quite unlike the student 
activities at issue in Vernonia, in which the combination of illegal drug use and 
physical exertion could create substantial health risks, the Earls plurality upheld 
suspicionless drug testing for students involved in nonathletic extracurricular 
activities like show choir and the debate team,248 where the magnitude of potential 
harm would be comparatively low.  
2. The Nature and Severity of the Harm  
a. Taxpayer Subsidy of Illegal Drug Use  
There are circumstances in which we might be prepared to tolerate a blanket 
suspicionless search—e.g., a suspicionless search of all airline passengers and their 
carry-on luggage—because even if the probability of the harm is very low, the 
potential harm is very great. In contrast to the airplane case, however, the harm 
associated with a taxpayer subsidy of illegal drug use is small—primarily a few 
thousand in lost taxpayer dollars. In Florida, it appears that H.B. 353 has actually 
cost taxpayers more money than it has saved. Florida law requires the state to 
reimburse applicants who test negative for drugs. According to the Florida DCF, at 
an average cost of $30 per test, the total reimbursement cost to the state was 
$118,140.249 DCF estimates that H.B. 353 has cost the state an additional $45,780, 
since the reimbursement costs were far more than the state would have spent on 
income assistance had it provided benefits to the 108 people who failed the test.250  
Those who continue to support a drug testing requirement nonetheless offer two 
replies to these findings. First, the real reason to require TANF applicants to pass a 
drug test is to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent on “diapers and Wheaties” rather 
than illegal drugs.251 Without a drug test, states cannot be sure that taxpayer dollars 
will reach their intended beneficiaries. Second, states have a basic interest in 
ensuring that taxpayer dollars are not used to fund an illegal activity. In support of a 
drug testing law in Oklahoma, Representative Liebmann put it this way: “Even if it 
didn’t save a dime, this legislation would be worth enacting based on principle . . . . 
Law-abiding citizens should not have their tax payments used to fund illegal activity 
that puts us all in danger.”252  
To the extent that states rest the case for drug testing on principle, arguments of 
this kind come dangerously close to resting the case for suspicionless drug testing on 
a symbolic interest—an interest forcefully rejected by eight Justices in Chandler. In 
response, those who support a drug testing requirement might argue, as some have, 
that “[t]he drug testing law was really meant to make sure that kids were 
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protected,”253 or to make sure that taxpayer dollars reach their intended beneficiaries, 
the latter being a government interest endorsed by the Court in Wyman.254 In 
Chandler, however, the Supreme Court held that “the proffered special need” for a 
drug test must be “substantial.”255 The Court defined the term substantial as a 
government interest that is both “important enough to override the individual’s 
acknowledged privacy interest” and “sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”256 Even if the 
Supreme Court were to hold that the special needs doctrine encompasses 
government interests beyond an interest in public safety, the government interest in 
ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used as intended falls far short of “substantial” 
within the meaning of Chandler. Nor are courts likely to find that the government 
interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used as intended is “sufficiently vital” 
to suppress the individualized suspicion requirement. As Justices O’Connor, Souter, 
and Stevens remarked in their Vernonia dissent, “[f]or most of our constitutional 
history, mass, suspicionless searches have generally been considered per se 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”257 Indeed, the abuses 
associated with “general searches” were foremost on the minds of the Framers.258 If 
the Supreme Court were to hold that the government interest in ensuring that 
taxpayer dollars are used as intended is sufficient to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s ordinary requirement of individualized suspicion, doing so would 
amount to a vast expansion of government power with no foreseeable stopping point.  
b. Child Abuse and Neglect  
Supporters of drug testing have also argued that a state interest in preventing 
child abuse and neglect in the homes of TANF recipients constitutes a special need. 
In Lebron, Florida connected substance abuse among TANF recipients to adverse 
consequences for their children:  
A parent using drugs is less able to care for [their] children properly 
(neglect), is more likely to actively harm a child (abuse), is less able to 
procure and maintain employment, is more likely to come in contact 
with the criminal justice system and thus be removed from the home, 
and is more likely to set an inappropriate example for children and also 
provide those children with easier access to drugs (who, thus, might 
more readily abuse illegal drugs).259 
Many studies have shown that parental substance abuse can have a negative 
impact on children. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, between one and two-thirds of children who have been reported to child 
protective services come from families coping with substance abuse.260 Children 
whose parents abuse drugs often experience a home that is chaotic and 
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unpredictable.261 Children whose parents abuse drugs are also more likely to 
experience physical violence and sexual abuse.262 Still, the case for suspicionless 
drug testing is not without its problems. The special needs doctrine applies when 
governments face special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement.263 To 
the extent that states rest the case for suspicionless drug testing on a state interest in 
protecting children from acts of drug-related violence in the home—battery and 
sexual assault—they have asserted an interest in law enforcement.  
In Lebron, Florida went on to argue that by providing income assistance to low-
income families, the state “steps into the role of parent” or “economic provider,” and 
therefore, the state takes on a special responsibility to ensure that TANF funds are 
not used to subsidize drug use in the home.264 To that end, Florida relied on 
Vernonia, in which the Supreme Court held that suspicionless drug testing policies 
were not unreasonable given the custodial responsibilities of public schools for 
minor children in their care.265 Florida’s reliance on Vernonia, however, is 
misplaced. In both Vernonia and Earls, the Court described the custodial 
responsibilities of schools with respect to extracurricular activities on school 
grounds or school-sponsored field trips.266 In neither case did the Court suggest that 
the custodial responsibilities of schools extend into the home. Even if states did 
assume some special responsibility for the children of TANF recipients, neither 
Vernonia nor Earls suggest that a concern for the wellbeing of children would 
support a state interest in requiring their parents to pass a drug test.  
c. Drug Use, Employment, and Public Health  
In their defense, several states—including Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, and Florida—have argued that the federal government conditions TANF 
funding on a state’s ability to move TANF recipients from welfare to work.267 Since 
employers who participate in TANF programs are likely to require a drug test, and 
since illegal drug use undermines employability, states have a “special need” to 
exclude illegal drug users from the program.268 Yet, the Supreme Court has never 
suggested that a state interest in securing a steady funding stream constitutes a 
special governmental need. Nor are courts likely to see government interests of this 
kind as “substantial” within the meaning of Chandler. Nor is there much evidence to 
support state claims that the handful of TANF recipients who do use illegal drugs are 
likely to loll on welfare rolls for extended periods of time. According to the 
SAMHSA, roughly two-thirds of illegal drug users are employed either full time or 
part time.269 Florida’s H.B. 353 pilot study found that drug users were employed at 
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the same rate as non-users.270 Drug users earned approximately the same amount of 
money as non-users and they did not require more government assistance than non-
users.271  
In Marchwinski v. Howard, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit indicated 
that the public safety risks stemming from crime associated with illegal drug use and 
drug trafficking are either themselves a special need or at least a relevant 
consideration when determining whether states have met their burden to establish a 
special need.272 Picking up this thread in Lebron, Florida counted among its special 
needs the “public health” and “crime risks” associated with the drug epidemic.273 To 
that end, Florida asserted an interest in not funding that epidemic and its associated 
“public ills.”274 Although the public health and crime risks associated with illegal 
drug use are well known, there is little or no evidence that welfare recipients are 
important contributors to the drug problem. Without a genuine threat to public health 
or public safety, states cannot meet their burden to establish a special need.  
B. THE NATURE AND INTRUSIVENESS OF THE SEARCH  
Courts will also consider the nature and intrusiveness of the search. Most states 
have proposed to test welfare recipients for drugs using a urine test. In each of the 
special needs cases where the Court has upheld drug testing policies, urine samples 
were monitored by “listening for normal sounds of urination,” either behind a closed 
stall or by standing directly behind the person producing a urine sample, but not 
under direct observation.275 Consistent with Skinner and Von Raab, Florida law 
would not require laboratories to monitor TANF applicants as they produce urine 
samples under direct observation. Instead Florida law simply instructs the Florida 
DCF to provide each person with a “reasonable degree of dignity” consistent with 
the state’s interest in obtaining a reliable sample.276  
More difficult questions arise with respect to the intrusiveness of a drug test. 
Before a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against H.B. 353 in 
November 2011, temporarily halting Florida’s drug testing program, H.B. 353 
allowed DCF to enter drug test results into a database accessible by law enforcement 
agencies.277 Florida also indicated its intention to report test results to the Florida 
Child Abuse Hotline.278 In February 2012, however, the Florida DCF retreated from 
its earlier position. Instead, DCF has published a new rule, indicating that the 
Department will not report test results to the Child Abuse Hotline, nor will DCF 
share test results with law enforcement.279  
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1. A Fourth Amendment Perspective  
The Supreme Court has provided uncertain and conflicting guidance as to 
whether drug test results obtained through the special needs doctrine can be shared 
with law enforcement agencies or child protective services. In its classic 
formulation, the special needs doctrine permits suspicionless searches when 
governments confront special needs “beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”280 In its early special needs cases, however, the Supreme Court 
appeared untroubled when the fruits of a special needs search were used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. In T.L.O., Justice Blackmun did not object when 
prosecutors charged T.L.O. with juvenile delinquency based on evidence of drug 
dealing seized from her purse.281 Nor did Justice Scalia object in Griffin when police 
officers searched Griffin’s home and prosecutors used a gun seized in that search to 
charge Griffin with a weapons offense.282  
In its more recent special needs cases, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
handing test results over to law enforcement officials would impugn an otherwise 
valid administrative scheme. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court 
struck down state regulations that permitted drug tests for obstetrics patients without 
their consent and without a reasonable suspicion of drug use, owing to the excessive 
entanglement of law enforcement in the creation and execution of the policy.283 
Justice Stevens indicated that the “critical difference” between the hospital drug 
testing policy on the one hand and previous special needs cases on the other, was 
that in each of the previous cases, the special need for drug testing was “divorced 
from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”284 In Vernonia, for example, 
the Court held that the School District instituted a drug testing policy for “distinctly 
nonpunitive purposes,” namely protecting student athletes from drug-related injury 
and deterring illegal drug use among students.285 In Skinner, the Court indicated that 
the Federal Railroad Administration required drug tests to prevent train accidents 
and fatalities, “not to assist in the prosecution of employees.”286  
At times, proponents of drug testing have alluded to state interests that appear to 
be distinguishable from a general state interest in law enforcement; for example, a 
state interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars reach their intended beneficiaries, or 
eliminating drug-related barriers to employment.287 Nonetheless, throughout the 
debate surrounding drug testing and public assistance, states have largely rested the 
case for drug testing on a state interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are not used 
to subsidize illegal drug use. In Lebron, Florida averred: “[T]he government has 
spent untold resources over the last thirty years fighting the “war on drugs.” Surely, 
then, the government has a paramount interest in not funding the drug epidemic and 
its associated public ills.”288  
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To that end, opponents of drug testing might argue that states have failed to 
demonstrate that the primary purpose of drug testing is to further a valid non-law 
enforcement interest. However, notwithstanding Ferguson, the Supreme Court has 
also said that a lawful suspicionless search may serve multiple purposes, including a 
state interest in law enforcement. In New York v. Burger, the Court confronted the 
mirror image of Ferguson—the primary purpose of the search was administrative, 
but authorities also discovered evidence of criminal conduct in the process.289 
Ironically, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court upheld a New 
York statute designed to prevent auto theft by authorizing the police to conduct 
suspicionless searches of automobile junkyards.290 According to Justice Blackmun, 
what lower courts failed to realize was that “a State can address a major social 
problem both by way of an administrative scheme . . . and through penal 
sanctions.”291 Penal laws and administrative regulations may aim toward the same 
“ultimate purpose” even if the regulatory goals of an administrative search are 
narrower.292 The Court added that auto theft was a “significant social problem” and 
New York had a “substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling industry 
because of this problem.”293 
Appealing to Burger, supporters of drug testing might argue that a valid 
administrative search may have the same ultimate purpose as the penal law—
namely, combating illegal drug use—even if its regulatory goals are narrower, like 
weeding illegal drug users out of public assistance programs. Moreover, the fruits of 
that search can also be used in a criminal prosecution. As Justice Blackmun argued 
in Burger, a valid administrative scheme does not become unconstitutional merely 
because an officer discovers evidence of a crime in addition to a violation of the 
administrative statute itself.294 Nor is evidence garnered from that search 
inadmissible.  
In Ferguson, Justice Stevens attempted to reconcile the tension between the 
hospital drug testing policy and Burger by proposing that where the individual 
interest in privacy is “particularly attenuated” or where the discovery of criminal 
evidence is “merely incidental to the purpose of the administrative search,” the 
search may fall within the scope of the special needs doctrine.295 Although the 
Supreme Court has long held that a lesser expectation of privacy attaches to 
commercial property and other “closely regulated industries,” in what sense was the 
discovery of stolen auto parts “merely incidental”? The statute authorized police 
officers to search junkyards for stolen vehicles, in an effort to combat what the 
Burger Court itself described as a “serious social problem in automobile theft.”296 
The Court’s attempt to explain away the discovery of stolen auto parts as “merely 
incidental,” and thereby salvage the holding in Burger, speaks to a longstanding 
dilemma in the special needs doctrine: In what sense must a special need lie “beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement?”297 Ferguson attempted to answer that 
question by emphasizing that the immediate objective of the hospital drug testing 
policy was to generate evidence that would be admissible in a subsequent criminal 
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prosecution.298 The Court also highlighted the excessive involvement of law 
enforcement officers in both the creation and day-to-day administration of the 
policy.299  
Unlike in Ferguson, there is little evidence that the “immediate objective” or 
“primary purpose” of imposing a drug testing requirement on public assistance is to 
generate evidence for a criminal proceeding. Nor is there evidence of an excessive 
entanglement between public assistance programs and law enforcement. To that end, 
courts might well conclude that the primary purpose of requiring TANF recipients to 
pass a drug test is administrative; therefore, evidence of illegal drug use is 
admissible in a criminal prosecution under Burger.  
2. A Public Health Perspective  
What can public health and the population perspective add to this disarray? The 
differences between a population-based legal analysis, on the one hand, and a 
conventional Fourth Amendment analysis on the other are markedly evident with 
respect to the nature and intrusiveness of a special needs search. From a 
conventional Fourth Amendment perspective, the central questions with respect to 
the nature and intrusiveness of a search are whether drug testing furthers a valid non-
law enforcement interest, and whether sharing test results with third parties would 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy held by public assistance recipients. 
However, from a public health perspective, the important issues have little to do 
with the Ferguson problems that arise when the fruits of a special needs search are 
turned over to law enforcement. Instead, the important questions concern the impact 
of drug testing requirements on the health of illegal drug users and the people around 
them.  
A proponent of population-based legal analysis would keep two considerations 
in mind. First, regulations to protect the public’s health often involve risk-risk 
tradeoffs. Such tradeoffs occur when interventions designed to decrease one risk 
simultaneously increase another.300 Second, a public health perspective, particularly 
a population-level perspective, would consider the likely health impacts of drug 
testing requirements on people who use illegal drugs, as well as likely “spillover 
effects” on their minor children and the communities around them. Requiring public 
assistance recipients to pass a drug test would decrease the risk that taxpayer dollars 
are used to fund illegal drug use. On the other hand, if parents are concerned that 
they might test positive for drugs, then sharing positive test results with child 
protective services or law enforcement could deter parents from applying for public 
assistance for fear that they might lose custody of their children or face 
incarceration. Paradoxically, by driving at-risk parents away from social services, 
policies designed to protect children could actually increase the risk that children 
who are in abusive homes will go undetected. 
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Qualitative studies on pregnant women who use illegal drugs have shown that 
sharing test results with law enforcement tends to discourage women from seeking 
necessary assistance.301 A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (the 
precursor to the U.S. Government Accountability Office) found that for drug-
dependent women, the fear of legal repercussions appeared to be a potent barrier to 
health care:  
Drug treatment and prenatal care providers told us that the increasing 
fear of incarceration and losing children to foster care is discouraging 
pregnant women from seeking care. Women are reluctant to seek 
treatment if there is a possibility of punishment. They also fear that if 
their children are placed in foster care, they will never get their 
children back.302 
Anticipating such problems, most states allow parents who test positive for 
drugs to appoint a third-party beneficiary to receive benefits on behalf of a minor 
child.303 However, parents may be reluctant to disclose their need for a third-party 
beneficiary to a friend or family member. According to the Florida DCF, the number 
of TANF applications has declined since drug testing began in July 2011, suggesting 
both that H.B. 353 has had its intended deterrent effect, but also that TANF 
applicants who use drugs have not enrolled their children in TANF through third-
party beneficiaries.304  
From a public health perspective, sharing positive test results with law 
enforcement officers is clearly a bad idea—doing so would drive an already 
marginalized group of women further underground. The problem for population-
based analysis is this: What legal significance, if any, should courts attach to these 
insights? Should we say that these policies are unreasonable and unconstitutional 
insofar as they conflict with the insights of public health? Probably not. Doing so 
would invite courts to outstrip their competence and open population-based analysis 
to charges of Lochner-ing in the name the public health.  
Nonetheless, Parmet presents the population perspective not merely as a set of 
public health inspired values from which to critique legal discourse, but also as a 
tool of legal reasoning.305 She urges courts to embrace population health as “a chief 
value of law,” one that “judges and lawyers should apply when they interpret legal 
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texts and authority.”306 However, if we think that courts should not allow population 
health concerns to trump conventional legal reasoning—or that population health 
should only play a supporting role in our thinking about the nature and intrusiveness 
of a special needs search—Parmet will find it difficult to make good on her claim 
that population-based analysis is indeed a tool of legal reasoning, not merely a 
policy perspective from which to critique legal decisions. 
C. EFFECTIVENESS  
Courts will also ask whether laws that condition public assistance benefits on 
passing a drug test are “reasonably likely” to achieve their objectives. Although 
several states have passed laws that require TANF applicants to pass a drug test 
before they qualify for benefits, state laws differ from one another in important 
ways. In Florida and Georgia, state laws require all TANF applicants to pass a drug 
test before they qualify for assistance.307 In Arizona, Missouri and Utah, state laws 
require a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before TANF programs can require 
a drug test.308 Although a few states, like Missouri, would allow TANF applicants 
who test positive for drugs to retain their benefits on the condition that they 
participate in a substance abuse treatment program,309 Florida and Georgia would 
not.310 Eventually, all states with these laws would suspend assistance to someone 
who continues to test positive for drugs.  
Since Vernonia, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed effectiveness as an 
element of the special needs doctrine. However, courts tend to assume that 
suspicionless searches are reasonably likely to accomplish their objectives.311 As 
Part IV.C argues, courts should assume a more aggressive posture when evaluating 
the effectiveness of a search under the special needs doctrine. The Supreme Court 
should also incorporate a least-intrusive alternative requirement into the special 
needs doctrine. Without a requirement to seek the least-intrusive alternative, special 
needs searches are needlessly over-inclusive.  
1. Taxpayer Subsidy of Illegal Drug Use  
The Supreme Court has been of two minds about the role of effectiveness in a 
special needs analysis. In Von Raab, the Court rejected the petitioner’s contention 
that requiring a drug test as a condition of promotion in the Customs Service was 
unreasonable since employees could schedule the date of their drug test and arguably 
abstain from illegal drug use in advance of the test.312 Justice Kennedy reasoned that 
drug addicts would be unable to abstain from drugs, even for a limited period of 
time. He also noted that in any event, the amount of time that it would take for a 
particular drug to become undetectable in the system varies widely from person to 
person, and that information would likely remain unknown to the employee.313 
Several years later in Chandler, however, the Supreme Court struck down 
suspicionless drug testing as a condition of placement on the Georgia state ballot, 
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reasoning that “Georgia’s certification requirement [was] not well designed to 
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws . . . .”314 As Justice Ginsburg 
remarked, drug tests scheduled by the candidate were “no secret” and the 
government failed to explain why ordinary law enforcement mechanisms were 
insufficient to identify illegal drug users “should they appear in the limelight of the 
public stage.”315 
Requiring TANF applicants to pass a drug test on their initial application for 
benefits would fail to identify the small number of TANF applicants who do in fact 
use drugs. Not unlike the drug tests at issue in Von Raab and Chandler, Florida’s 
H.B. 353 would require a onetime drug test as part of an initial application for 
TANF benefits, and, as in Chandler, the date of a drug test to be scheduled by the 
TANF applicant is “no secret.”316 States like Florida have failed to explain why most 
TANF applicants would be unable to abstain from illegal drug use long enough to 
avoid detection. Of those public assistance recipients who have reported illegal drug 
use during the past month or year, most report use of marijuana.317 Marijuana is not 
a highly addictive substance, and for most people, the metabolites of marijuana 
become undetectable through urine analysis after 10 days.318 A small number of 
public assistance recipients have reported use of “hard drugs” like cocaine and 
methamphetamine.319 Although highly addictive, the metabolites of these drugs are 
detectable in the system for only a few days.320 Most TANF applicants, save those 
who are prohibitively addicted, would probably be able to pass a scheduled drug 
test.  
As in Chandler, state statutes that would require new TANF applicants to 
complete a scheduled drug test are not well designed to identify applicants who have 
violated antidrug laws, but what about random drug testing? In Marchwinski v. 
Howard, Michigan proposed to combine an initial drug test for TANF applicants 
with random drug testing for current TANF recipients.321 Random drug testing 
would allow states to identify TANF applicants who have used illegal drugs; 
however, as this Article argues above,322 courts are unlikely to see a state interest in 
ensuring that taxpayer dollars reach their intended beneficiaries as “substantial” 
within the meaning of Chandler.  
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2. Drug Use and Employment  
Proponents of drug testing have also argued that statutes like H.B. 353 are 
designed to address government interests beyond merely identifying potential misuse 
of taxpayer dollars, for example, a state interest in giving people an incentive to get 
off drugs or encouraging the transition from welfare to work.323 What should we 
make of these claims? In 1997 Congress eliminated Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) for people with a primary diagnosis of drug addiction.324 Not unlike H.B. 353, 
the purpose of eliminating SSI benefits for people with a primary diagnosis of drug 
addiction was to encourage substance abusers to take responsibility for their illegal 
drug use.325 Also not unlike H.B. 353, an important purpose of the federal benefit 
termination was to address a public perception that providing federal disability 
benefits to drug addicts only enabled their illegal drug use.326 Although some former 
SSI beneficiaries were able to secure stable employment, many others were not.  
Without employment, many former SSI beneficiaries turned to TANF and state 
emergency relief, resulting in cost-shifting onto states and local governments. A 
longitudinal study of former SSI beneficiaries found that within two years of benefit 
termination, twenty percent of former beneficiaries reported income assistance from 
other public programs including TANF, general assistance, and veterans’ benefits.327 
Another study found that after four years, nearly forty percent of former SSI 
beneficiaries in Northern California reported TANF or general state assistance as 
their primary source of income.328 The same study found that former SSI 
beneficiaries who came to rely on TANF or general assistance also reported an 
increase in their utilization of mental health services.329 The federal experience 
suggests that if states were to withhold public assistance benefits from people who 
fail a drug test, or from those who are unable to complete a substance abuse 
treatment program, the cost of these policies may be passed onto others, or felt 
downstream, in other parts of the social safety net.  
It may be that those who were able to complete the transition from federal 
disability benefits to work were among the least impaired. A Chicago study found 
that when compared to former beneficiaries who were able to secure even marginal 
employment of at least $500 a month, former disability beneficiaries who remained 
unemployed or underemployed were five times more likely to be drug dependent and 
seven times more likely to be psychiatrically impaired.330 Those who were unable to 
secure employment were also more likely to be dependent on cocaine or heroin, and 
far less likely to have any means of social support save for friends or family 
members, or possibly resorting to illegal activities.331 Although states vary in the 
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penalties attached to a positive drug test, studies like this one suggest that for those 
who are the most vulnerable, the most bereft of resources—and therefore most likely 
to contribute to the public health and crime risks associated with the drug 
epidemic—removing public assistance benefits without further social support is 
more likely to exacerbate the problem than alleviate it.  
In Florida, TANF applicants who test positive for drugs are ineligible for 
income assistance through TANF, with no option to retain their benefits while 
participating in a treatment program.332 However, a few states, like Missouri, have 
proposed a middle ground. In these states, TANF applicants who test positive for 
drugs have the option to retain their benefits on the condition that they enroll in a 
substance abuse treatment program for six months and do not test positive for drugs 
while participating in the program.333 Anyone who tests positive for drugs a second 
time would be TANF-ineligible for three years.334 In Florida, TANF applicants who 
test positive for drugs would be ineligible for income assistance, but remain eligible 
for other benefits like food stamps and childcare.335 In Missouri, however, TANF 
recipients who test positive a second time would lose access to all of their TANF 
benefits during that three year period—including temporary cash assistance, food 
stamps, child care, and other state programs, partially funded through TANF.336  
Sooner or later, many, if not most, people who are required to participate in a 
substance abuse treatment program will relapse.337 From a public health perspective, 
the question is whether the loss of public assistance benefits will provide an 
effective incentive for beneficiaries to stop using illegal drugs. For some casual drug 
users, the possibility of losing their TANF benefits might be enough to stop using 
drugs, but for those who are truly drug-dependent, the answer is probably not. 
Decades of research on addiction have shown that prolonged drug use can alter the 
structure and function of the brain.338 When areas of the brain involved in reward, 
memory, and inhibition are disrupted, the capacity to stop using drugs is also 
impaired, even if continued drug use means the person stands to lose everything he 
once valued.339 The result is that negative incentives like threatening public 
assistance recipients with the loss of benefits like income assistance, public housing, 
or unemployment programs probably will not provide an effective incentive for them 
to stop using drugs. There is also the further concern alluded to above—namely, that 
if states push drug addicts out of public assistance programs, the costs of doing so 
may be felt by others.  
3. Child Abuse and Neglect  
Supporters of drug testing argue that these policies are justified by a state 
interest in combating drug-related child abuse and neglect. Yet, as this Article 
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argues,340 if parents are even remotely concerned that they might test positive for 
drugs, sharing test results with law enforcement could deter parents from applying 
for public assistance for fear that they might lose custody of their children or face 
incarceration. By driving at-risk parents away from social services, states could 
actually increase the risk that children who are in abusive homes are undetected.  
Denying public assistance benefits to parents who use illegal drugs could create 
additional problems for low-income children, even apart from communication with 
law enforcement. A study of welfare recipients in Chicago found that substantial 
declines in welfare income, problems with utility assistance, food shortages, and 
eviction threats all significantly increased the risk of child welfare involvement.341 
Without income assistance, most parents in the study lacked sufficient resources to 
secure basic household needs, thereby putting their children at risk. As one woman 
remarked, welfare income provides her with “stable money,” the money that she and 
her children rely on when a part-time job does not last for more than a few months, 
or when an employer cannot provide more than a few hours of work.342  
Although most state proposals would allow parents who test positive for drugs 
to continue receiving food stamps or child care services in an effort to insulate 
children from the impact of welfare sanctions on their parents, these safeguards are 
likely to be inadequate. A 2002 study on welfare reform found that welfare sanctions 
resulting in a loss of income significantly increased the risk that children faced food 
insecurity, even when families continued to receive food stamps.343 For most people, 
the average monthly food stamp benefit does not provide enough money to buy 
healthy food.344 A large literature on nutrition has shown that micronutrient 
deficiencies at an early age are associated with a wide variety of adverse outcomes 
for children, ranging from impaired cognitive development and poor school 
performance to chronic disease and increased susceptibility to infection.345 As a 
result, although states have adopted drug testing requirements to sanction adults who 
use illegal drugs, withholding public assistance benefits from parents could 
inadvertently harm their children.  
4. Population-Based Analysis  
Given everything we know about poverty, addiction, and the federal experience 
with SSI benefits, courts could easily conclude that withholding public assistance 
from people who use illegal drugs would be unlikely to achieve many of the states’ 
objectives, for example, incentivizing the transition from welfare to work, providing 
an incentive for people to stop using drugs, and combating child neglect. Then again, 
what about the government interest in “not funding the drug epidemic and its 
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associated public ills?”346 Or the state interest in ensuring that TANF funds reach 
their intended beneficiaries? Courts may well conclude that these interests are 
“substantial” and “beyond the normal need for law enforcement” within the 
parameters of Chandler, T.L.O., and Earls. Random drug tests are also reasonably 
likely to identify TANF recipients who have used illegal drugs, thereby furthering 
the state interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used as intended. As such, 
these interests might well pass constitutional muster.  
If so, the problems for population-based analysis are plain. What legal 
significance should courts attach to population health? Insofar as states have asserted 
an interest in ensuring that TANF funds reach their intended beneficiaries—clearly 
not a public health goal—Parmet would be hard pressed to explain why courts 
should consider “the promotion of public health as a relevant factor in their 
analysis.”347 Not unlike sharing drug test results with law enforcement agencies, 
requiring public assistance recipients to pass a drug test might be reasonably likely 
to accomplish at least some of the states’ interests and be eminently reasonable from 
a Fourth Amendment perspective, yet a horrible idea from a public health 
perspective. What should we say when the insights of public health and conventional 
legal reasoning conflict? Parmet might respond that “the wellbeing of the 
community is the highest law,” moreover, “law exists, in part, to serve the common 
good.”348 Yet not all law has population health as its goal. Indeed, current drug 
testing requirements are not at all motivated by public health.  
5. The Least Intrusive Alternative  
Even when policies are well designed and reasonably likely to accomplish their 
objectives, they still may impose unacceptable burdens on individual rights.349 In 
public health, the requirement to seek the least intrusive alternative instructs officials 
to adopt policies that achieve their objectives as well or better than possible 
alternatives, while imposing the fewest burdens on individual interests.350 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require governments to adopt the least intrusive alternative. In 
Earls, Justice Thomas flatly asserted that a reasonable government search does not 
require an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing; to that end, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require governments to seek the least intrusive alternative.351 
The categorical rejection of the least intrusive alternative requirement issued by the 
plurality in Earls reflects a larger and longstanding debate about the relationship 
between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice Thomas, an adherent to the Reasonableness school of thought, 
has long defended the position that the Warrant Clause does not inform the 
Reasonableness Clause, casting doubt about whether the Fourth Amendment would 
require a individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.352  
Whatever one might think about the relationship between the Reasonableness 
Clause and the Warrant Clause, the requirement that the government adopt the least 
intrusive means of accomplishing its objectives remains a fundamental element of a 
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reasonable government search. If the government can accomplish its objectives as 
well or better through means that impose fewer burdens on personal rights and 
freedoms, a more intrusive method would be patently unreasonable.353 Without 
incorporating a least intrusive alternative requirement into the special needs 
doctrine, government searches may be over-inclusive, sweeping far more people 
than necessary under the ambit of regulation. In this case, since the vast majority of 
people who receive public assistance from the government do not use illegal drugs, 
requiring all of them to take a drug test would be vastly overinclusive, with little or 
no public health gain.  
At times, the Supreme Court has suggested that the problem with incorporating 
a less intrusive alternative requirement into the special needs doctrine is that it 
would be too difficult for courts to imagine less intrusive alternatives to the 
proposed government program. In Earls, Justice Thomas added that “[t]he logic of 
such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers 
to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”354 Why should that be the 
case? Even if the Supreme Court were reluctant to incorporate the least intrusive 
alternative requirement into its general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that alone 
should not discourage the Court from adding a least intrusive alternative requirement 
to the special needs doctrine. Doing so would not require courts to hypothesize 
potential less intrusive alternatives. Instead, not unlike other areas of the law in 
which courts engage in a least intrusive alternative analysis, the government should 
bear the burden of demonstrating that its objectives could not be achieved as well or 
better through less intrusive methods.  
a. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing  
In Earls, a plurality of the Court insisted that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require consideration of less intrusive alternatives.355 In Chandler, however, Justice 
Ginsburg strongly suggested that Georgia ought to explain why an appearance in the 
“limelight of the public stage” would not suffice to apprehend addicted candidates 
for public office and that the state’s failure to provide such an explanation was a 
constitutionally relevant consideration.356 In doing so, the Supreme Court seemed to 
suggest that a reasonable search under the special needs doctrine might require 
governments to seek the least intrusive means to accomplish their objectives. In the 
same way, the Chandler majority contrasted the circumstances of candidates for 
public office—subject to relentless scrutiny by their peers, the public, and the 
press—to those of the customs agents at issue in Von Raab, for whom it would not 
have been feasible to subject their behavior to the day-to-day scrutiny that is the 
norm in an ordinary office environment.357 The very strong suggestion emerging 
from Chandler is that when government actors are able to detect drug related 
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impairment without a drug test, blanket suspicionless drug tests are “not needed” 
and inappropriate.358  
In contrast to the customs agents in Von Raab, welfare recipients are subject to 
constant scrutiny. Most states require regularly scheduled home visits as a condition 
of receiving welfare benefits, and regularly scheduled appointments with case 
managers to review eligibility for benefits and progress toward employment.359 Since 
each of these activities provides an opportunity for welfare programs to identify 
drug-related impairment, without subjecting all welfare recipients to a drug test, 
Chandler suggests that blanket suspicionless drug tests for all welfare recipients may 
be unreasonable.  
Instead, most states require a reasonable suspicion of drug use before 
conducting a drug test. A few states require TANF applicants to complete a survey 
or recent drug use questionnaire.360 However, since few applicants disclose illegal 
drug use, most states rely on case managers to recognize the signs of drug use: eyes 
that appear red, glazed, or unable to focus; slurred speech; and poor coordination. 
While drug testing based on a reasonable suspicion of drug use rests on surer Fourth 
Amendment grounds, from a public health perspective, suspicion-based approaches 
are not without their problems. Although there are some classic signs of drug use, 
courts have at times looked favorably upon factors with questionable value: being 
unusually tired or unusually active; excessive meticulousness or an unusually messy 
appearance; changes in behavior; and even showing up late or unusually early for an 
activity.361 If courts permit such a wide range of factors to create a reasonable 
suspicion of illegal drug use, unscrupulous case managers could easily use the 
pretense of reasonable suspicion of drug use to harass unpopular clients. Requiring 
case managers to request a drug test when they have reason to believe that their 
clients are using drugs could also undermine the trust between caseworker and 
client.  
Yet, however imperfect, policies that require a reasonable suspicion of drug use 
are preferable to a regime of blanket, suspicionless drug testing for all welfare 
recipients. By itself, being unusually tired, or even unusually messy or disheveled, 
does not (or should not) create a reasonable suspicion of drug use. However, when 
taken together with some of the indicators described above (eyes that appear glazed 
or unusually fixed, poor coordination, and slurred speech), certain signs such as a 
particularly disheveled appearance or unusual sluggishness can create a reasonable 
suspicion of illegal drug use. Under such circumstances, we have less reason to 
worry about abuse. Policies that offer people who test positive for drugs the 
opportunity to participate in a substance abuse program can also mitigate some of 
the harmful effects of suspicion-based testing on the caseworker client relationship.  
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D. THE INDIVIDUAL INTEREST IN PRIVACY  
1. A Fourth Amendment Perspective  
Finally, courts must consider the individual interest in privacy. From a 
conventional Fourth Amendment perspective, the central question with respect to the 
privacy interests of welfare recipients is whether drug testing intrudes upon a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has appealed to a variety of 
factors in order to determine whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable. At 
times, the Supreme Court has suggested that whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy depends upon his or her relationship with the state. In Griffin, 
the Supreme Court held that although a probationer’s home is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, the supervisory relationship between the probationer and the 
State permits “a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be 
constitutional if applied to the public at large.”362 The Supreme Court has also said 
that voluntary participation in a closely regulated industry can diminish an otherwise 
reasonable expectation of privacy.363 Extending that logic to schoolchildren in 
Vernonia and Earls, the Court held that, not unlike “adults who choose to participate 
in a closely regulated industry,” children who participate in extracurricular activities 
voluntarily subject themselves to a greater degree of regulation than others.364 
Moreover, public school children are subject to countless school rules and public 
health regulations, in addition to the rules governing their extracurricular activities, 
all of which work to diminish their expectations of privacy.365 Applying the logic of 
Vernonia and Earls, courts might conclude that public assistance recipients 
voluntarily subject themselves to a higher degree of regulation than others and 
therefore enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy.  
Still, arguments along these lines are vulnerable to a few objections. In both 
Vernonia and Earls, the Court based its decision on the custodial responsibilities of 
public schools when children are entrusted to their care.366 In a strongly worded 
conclusion, the Court limited its decision to public schoolchildren and “caution[ed] 
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass muster in 
other contexts.”367 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chandler v. Miller 
casts considerable doubt on the role of voluntariness when determining individual 
expectations of privacy. In Chandler, the Supreme Court held that blanket 
suspicionless drug testing of all candidates for state office violated the Fourth 
Amendment, even though candidates seeking public office did so voluntarily.368 
Instead, Chandler suggests that whether individuals have a diminished expectation 
of privacy depends in large part on the strength of the government interest in a 
search.  
The Court took a similar approach in Skinner and Von Raab. In both cases, the 
Supreme Court asserted that an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy can be 
diminished by a compelling government interest in public safety. In Skinner, the 
Court concluded that the privacy expectations of railroad employees were 
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diminished by virtue of “their participation in an industry that is heavily regulated to 
ensure safety,” notably, “a goal, dependent in substantial part, on the health and 
fitness of covered employees.”369 Likewise, with respect to the customs agents at 
issue in Von Raab, the Court concluded that, since “successful performance of their 
duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,” customs agents “cannot 
reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly 
on their fitness.”370  
Taken together, Chandler, Von Raab, and Skinner suggest that what matters is 
whether the government has demonstrated an “important” or “substantial” interest in 
requiring all public assistance recipients to pass a drug test. Even if the government 
interests at stake are more than symbolic, the government interest in saving a few 
thousand in taxpayer dollars probably does not rank as substantial or important 
within the meaning of Chandler. To the extent that the government has failed to 
demonstrate a substantial or important interest in requiring all public assistance 
recipients to pass a drug test, courts should conclude that the government interest in 
a suspicionless drug test is not sufficiently vital to outweigh the individual interest in 
privacy. 
2. A Public Health Perspective  
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that while the Fourth 
Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy, the reasonable expectations 
of privacy held by citizens are not the only interests the Fourth Amendment 
protects.371 To the contrary, “its protections go further, and often have nothing to do 
with privacy at all.”372 At times the Court has instead underscored the dignity and 
liberty interests implicated by a blanket search. Famously remarking upon 
prohibition era laws aimed at concealed transportation of liquor in Caroll v. United 
States, Chief Justice Taft added: “It would be intolerable and unreasonable” if a 
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the highway “and 
thus subject all persons to the inconvenience and indignity of a search.”373  
In the same way, a large body of literature on social epidemiology, law, and 
social status points toward a broader understanding of Fourth Amendment values. 
As Scott Burris and Ichiro Kawachi have argued, law may be a powerful social 
determinant of health.374 Burris and Kawachi posit two relationships between law 
and public health. First, the law may play a role in creating and maintaining the 
social structures that influence population health such as adequate housing, 
workplace safety, income inequality, and stable employment.375 The law might also 
act as a pathway along which social determinants impact population health.376 
Drawing from the literature on procedural justice, Burris and Kawachi argue that 
encounters with the law can be a “powerful psychosocial experience” through which 
“low socioeconomic status is reinforced and driven home.”377  
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Ethnographic studies on welfare point toward similar conclusions. Describing 
her experience with a local welfare office, one woman in Appalachian Ohio 
remarked: “Well, I feel cheap when I walk in there. I feel that everybody’s looking 
at me and like she ain’t got no job, she’s dirty, and I just feel worse when I go in 
there and come out than I did going in there.”378 Another added: “They act like they 
own us. [Researcher:] How does that make you feel? [Response:] It makes me feel 
real low.”379  
It may be that encounters like this one have implications for our health. In a 
well-known study of British civil servants, Michael Marmot found that lower 
positions in the occupational hierarchy were associated with greater risk for 
coronary heart disease.380 Differences in access to health care could not explain the 
social gradient in health since all of the civil servants who participated in the study 
had universal access to health care. The study also found that risk factors such as 
smoking, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol levels accounted for less than 
one-third of the gradient in mortality due to coronary heart disease.381 Instead, 
researchers believe that low social status and low control at work, common among 
employees who occupy lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy, could explain 
their greater risk for coronary heart disease.382  
Further research supports the hypothesis that low social status can affect our 
health through the impact of stress on the cardiovascular system and the immune 
system. Repeated exposure to stressful events or failure to shut off the stress 
response efficiently can create wear and tear on the body, contributing to what social 
epidemiologists refer to as “allostatic load.”383 Over time, the cumulative burden of 
daily stressors can wear down the cardiovascular and immune systems, leading to 
diabetes, obesity, hypertension and greater susceptibility to infection.384  
What might these findings imply for the Fourth Amendment? What might they 
imply for the special needs doctrine? From a public health perspective, the Fourth 
Amendment protects more than our interests in privacy. By shielding us from the 
indignities of a government search, the Fourth Amendment protects our health.385 
The literature on social epidemiology suggests that the harms associated with 
suspicionless drug testing include more than the fleeting embarrassment of providing 
a urine sample while a lab technician stands outside the door “listening for the 
sounds of urination” and inspects the sample for tampering.386 Instead, the problem 
may be the way in which degrading treatment “gets under the skin.”387  
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VI. DRUG TESTING AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
Proposals to condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test raise a 
Fourth Amendment question and courts are likely to analyze these statutes under the 
special needs doctrine. However, as a conditional benefit, these policies also 
implicate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and in doing so they unearth a 
longstanding puzzle in constitutional law. Although neither the states nor the federal 
government are under an obligation to provide public assistance benefits, may the 
government provide public assistance on the condition that the recipient waive or 
surrender a constitutional right? Notwithstanding the power of government to 
withhold valuable benefits absolutely, the Supreme Court has limited the power of 
governments to provide benefits conditionally. To that end, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine limits the power of government to condition benefits on the 
waiver of a constitutional right. Part VI applies the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to drug testing and public assistance, with special attention to how the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures might 
complicate the unconstitutional conditions problem. Part VI concludes by taking a 
closer look at the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its critics. Part VI also 
asks how public health can deepen our understanding of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.  
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS  
1. Conditions Overturned  
The Supreme Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to 
individual rights for the first time in Speiser v. Randall.388 In Speiser, the Supreme 
Court struck down a California statute that required WWII veterans to swear loyalty 
to the state as a condition of receiving a tax exemption.389 In an opinion by Justice 
Brennan, the Court held that denying a tax exemption to veterans who refused to 
sign a loyalty oath would in effect “penalize” the claimants for engaging in 
proscribed speech, or “coerce” them into refraining from disloyal speech.390 To 
Brennan, the deterrent effect of the denial was no different than if the state were to 
issue a “fine” against proscribed speech.391  
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not 
deny unemployment benefits to a woman who refused to work on Saturday, the 
Sabbath Day of her faith, without burdening her interest in free exercise and 
violating the First Amendment.392 The Court conceded that the pressure on Mrs. 
Sherbert was at best indirect.393 No criminal statute compelled Mrs. Sherbert to work 
on Saturdays. However, as Justice Brennan wrote: “[I]f the purpose or effect of a 
law is to impede the observance . . . of religion,” then “that law is constitutionally 
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”394 In 
doing so, the Court began to answer a question left unanswered in Speiser: How can 
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a condition that we are free to accept or reject actually “burden” or “impinge upon” 
protected First Amendment interests? 
In Sherbert, the Court alluded to three justifications for a more searching 
review. First, the pressure on Mrs. Sherbert to forgo the practice of her religion was 
“unmistakable.”395 By conditioning unemployment benefits on acceptance of 
Saturday work, South Carolina presented Mrs. Sherbert with an impossible choice: 
follow the basic precepts of her religion and forego benefits on the one hand, or 
accept work and violate her religious beliefs on the other.396 Second, the conditional 
denial “threatened to produce a result which the State could not command 
directly.”397 Third, forcing Mrs. Sherbert to choose between her religion and 
unemployment benefits “puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of her 
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for Saturday worship.”398 Even 
though the law did not require Mrs. Sherbert to accept Saturday work, the coercive 
and deterrent effects were such that the Court would require South Carolina to come 
forward with a compelling state interest to justify the burden on free exercise. In its 
defense, South Carolina argued that the statute was justified by a state interest in 
deterring fraudulent religious claims.399 The Court found no evidence of fraud, and 
more importantly, even if there had been fraud, South Carolina failed to demonstrate 
that less restrictive means could not have achieved the government’s objectives.400  
Several years later the Court turned directly to public assistance benefits in 
Shapiro v. Thompson.401 In Shapiro, the Court struck down state statutes, as well as a 
statutory provision in the District of Columbia, that denied welfare benefits to 
residents who had not resided in their state or district for at least one year 
immediately preceding their application for welfare.402 The Court, per Justice 
Brennan, held that the statute created an invidious distinction between residents who 
had resided within the district for a year or more, and those who had been there for 
less than a year.403 He added: “On the basis of this sole difference the first class is 
granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the 
ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other 
necessities of life.”404 The District of Columbia asserted a compelling state interest 
in preserving the fiscal integrity of public assistance programs as well as 
administrative interests in budget planning and minimizing the risk of fraud.405 
However, the Shapiro Court rejected both claims, and paid little if any attention to 
the alleged administrative interests. Even if the state had acted on a compelling 
governmental interest in minimizing fraud, the Supreme Court held that there were 
“less drastic means” available to minimize the risk.406 
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Supreme Court also struck down 
an Arizona statute that conditioned nonemergency medical assistance at the county 
expense on residence within the state for at least the preceding twelve months.407 In 
                                                
395 Id. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 405. 
398 Id. at 404. 
399 Id. at 407. 
400 Id. 
401 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
402 Id. at 621-22. 
403 Id. at 627. 
404 Id. at 627. 
405 Id. at 633-36. 
406 Id. at 637. 
407 Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 250 (1974). 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, DRUG TESTING, AND THE LAW 73 
 
 
an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court clarified the deterrence and penalty 
rationales in Shapiro. Although the Court would consider whether a durational 
residence requirement deterred the right to travel, proof of actual deterrence was 
unnecessary.408 Instead, a residence requirement would trigger the Shapiro 
compelling interest test if it includes “any classification which serves to penalize the 
exercise of the right [to travel].”409 The Court took Shapiro to stand for the 
proposition that a “denial of the ‘basic necessities of life’” constitutes a penalty on 
the right to travel. To Justice Marshall, medical care was as much a basic necessity 
of life as welfare. 410  
Like Speiser and Sherbert before it, in Memorial Hospital the Court left the 
term “penalty” undefined, and instead hinted at when a condition might rise to the 
level of a penalty. First, Justice Marshall distinguished the “basic necessities of life” 
at issue in Shapiro from other instances in which the Court has upheld a one year in-
state residence requirement as condition of receiving lower in-state tuition. In doing 
so, Marshall suggested that the essential nature of medical care contributed to the 
willingness of the Court to characterize its denial as a penalty.411 Importantly, Justice 
Marshall added: “Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty 
analysis[,] . . . governmental privileges and benefits necessary to basic sustenance 
have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less 
essential forms of governmental entitlements.”412 In other words, whether or not a 
condition that would deny nonemergency medical care constituted a “penalty” 
within the meaning of Shapiro, the fact that medical care is a basic necessity has 
been reason enough for courts to review a potential denial with heightened scrutiny.  
2. Conditions Upheld  
In Sherbert and its progeny, as well as Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, the 
Supreme Court struck down the offending statute on the ground that it penalized or 
deterred the exercise of a fundamental right.413 In the abortion funding cases Maher 
v. Roe414 and Harris v. McRae,415 the Court seemed to move away from the penalty 
rationale. In Maher, the Supreme Court held that equal protection does not obligate 
states to pay for nontherapeutic abortions simply because they elect to pay for the 
expenses associated with childbirth.416 In Harris, the Court held that the federal 
government is not required to pay for medically necessary abortions, even though it 
funds other medically necessary services, including childbirth.417 In both cases, the 
Court reasoned that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity without more cannot be 
equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”418  
Several years later, in Lyng v. International Union, the Court upheld an 
amendment to the Food Stamp Act that prevented households from becoming 
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eligible for food stamps if members of the household were on strike.419 The Court 
thought it “exceedingly unlikely” that any more than a few workers might leave their 
families or their unions in order to increase the amount of food going to their 
households.420 Even if the amendment had pressured the associational rights of at 
least some strikers, the Constitution does not provide an entitlement to funds that 
might be necessary to realize the exercise of those rights.421  
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court also upheld a Maryland statute 
that limited the absolute dollar amount that AFDC families could receive to no more 
than $250 per family, per month, regardless of family size or need.422 Where Shapiro 
and Memorial Hospital implicated a fundamental right to travel, the AFDC 
limitation implicated no such right, and the Court held that the statute was rationally 
supportable on any number of grounds, including a state interest in promoting 
gainful employment and family planning, an interest in allocating public funds to as 
many families as possible, and an interest in maintaining some degree of equity 
between welfare recipients and wage earners.423 Through Justice Stewart, the Court 
acknowledged “the dramatically real factual difference” between the impoverished 
circumstances of persons seeking public assistance and other instances in which the 
Court applied rational basis review, but found no reason to apply a more rigorous 
standard.424  
Finally, in Wyman v. James, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that 
authorized home visits by an AFDC caseworker on the theory that home visits were 
not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and even if they were, 
home visits were not unreasonable.425 The Supreme Court also touched upon the 
unconstitutional conditions problem that arises when governments condition public 
assistance benefits on the surrender of a Fourth Amendment right. In a sharply 
worded opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that Mrs. James certainly had a “right” to 
refuse home visits, but doing so would simply result in a termination of benefits, and 
“nothing of a constitutional magnitude” was involved.426 If anything, to the Wyman 
majority, Mrs. James was the one who appeared to be unreasonable:  
What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her 
and her infant son with the necessities of life is the right to receive 
those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the 
Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms and to avoid 
questions of any kind.427  
To Justice Blackmun and members of the majority, the circumstances 
confronting Mrs. James were analogous to that of a taxpayer who refuses to furnish 
proof of a deduction. The taxpayer would be fully within his “right” not to produce 
proof, but doing so would result in “a detriment of the taxpayer’s own making.”428  
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B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
When analyzing unconstitutional conditions claims, courts will usually begin by 
asking whether the condition “burdens” or “impinges upon” protected interests. If 
so, courts will require the government to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling governmental interest. If not, courts will sustain the 
regulation with evidence of a rational relationship between means and ends. Before 
addressing those questions, however, the Fourth Amendment may present a unique 
set of concerns. Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when governments 
attempt to condition benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right. What might that 
imply for the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures? Must a plaintiff alleging a violation of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine first establish that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated before 
courts will proceed and consider her unconstitutional conditions claim? 
In Sanchez v. San Diego County, the Ninth Circuit considered and promptly 
rejected an unconstitutional conditions challenge to a government regulation that 
required welfare recipients to submit to a home “walk through” as a condition of 
participation in a county welfare program.429 Having established that home visits 
were reasonable, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their 
unconstitutional conditions claim, since the Fourth Amendment only prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures.430 The difference between the Ninth Circuit 
approach on the one hand and the plaintiff’s position on the other raises a hard 
question about how we should view Fourth Amendment rights for the purposes of an 
unconstitutional conditions analysis. Should we begin with the plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights ex ante, viewing the government as proposing to trade some part 
of those rights for valued benefits? Or should we consider the scope of the plaintiff’s 
rights ex post, viewed in relationship to a particular government program?  
Consider Lebron once more. Like anyone else, Mr. Lebron has a Fourth 
Amendment right to refuse unreasonable searches and seizures. Before Mr. Lebron 
walks into a Florida TANF office and signs on the dotted line, his bundle of Fourth 
Amendment rights includes the right to refuse a suspicionless drug test. In order to 
determine the reasonableness of a government search, courts will weigh competing 
governmental and individual interests. Absent an extraordinarily compelling or 
weighty government interest— for example, an extraordinary public health threat—
Florida could not order all Floridians to submit to a drug test, including Mr. Lebron. 
Nor, under garden-variety circumstances, could Florida criminalize the failure to 
submit to a drug test. The result is that ex ante TANF applicants have a Fourth 
Amendment right to refuse a drug test, and statutes like H.B. 353 in Florida offer 
them an opportunity to exchange some part of that right for public assistance 
benefits.  
The same was true in Speiser v. Randall, where the Supreme Court struck down 
a California statute that required World War II veterans to swear loyalty to the state 
as a condition of receiving a tax exemption.431 The First Amendment prohibits the 
State of California from abridging freedom of speech.432 The result is that WWII 
veterans have a First Amendment right to engage in disloyal speech. Why? With 
very few exceptions, the government does not have a compelling interest in 
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imposing prior restraints on speech. In Speiser, California offered veterans an 
opportunity to exchange their First Amendment right to engage in disloyal speech 
for a tax exemption.433 Had the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit approach 
in Speiser, Justice Brennan would have required World War II veterans to 
demonstrate that they have a First Amendment right to engage in disloyal speech 
and receive a tax exemption, before addressing the unconstitutional conditions 
problem.  
Ordinarily, however, the Court considers the scope of the plaintiff’s rights ex 
ante, without reference to the particular government program in question. Consider 
Sherbert v. Verner, where the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not 
deny unemployment benefits to a woman who refused to work on Saturday, the 
Sabbath Day of her faith, without burdening her interest in free exercise and 
violating the First Amendment.434 Justice Brennan began by describing the scope of 
Mrs. Sherbert’s First Amendment interest in free exercise. He explained that while 
the Court had rejected challenges to regulation of religious conduct when that 
conduct posed a substantial threat to public safety, Mrs. Sherbert’s First Amendment 
objection to Saturday work fell beyond the reach of government regulation.435 
Bearing the scope of Mrs. Sherbert’s First Amendment interest in mind—truncated 
only by the prior balance of government and individual interests—the Court then 
considered whether disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert for unemployment benefits imposed 
a burden on her interest in free exercise.436 Concluding that it did, the Court then 
asked whether the regulation was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental 
interest.437 If courts were to adopt the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in 
Sanchez, doing so would mean that courts will inevitably prune the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection twice: once since the plaintiff’s ex ante bundle of Fourth 
Amendment rights is not absolute (like Mrs. Sherbert, Mr. Lebron’s ex ante bundle 
of Fourth Amendment rights has already been limited by case law); and a second 
time, when courts balance the plaintiff’s residual Fourth Amendment interests in 
privacy against the government interest in a suspicionless search, all before reaching 
the unconstitutional conditions problem, if at all.  
Courts should instead ask whether the government program in question burdens 
or impinges upon the plaintiff’s ex ante bundle of Fourth Amendment rights. 
However, even if there is a viable Fourth Amendment right in play, determining the 
existence of that right only marks the beginning of an inquiry into the 
unconstitutional conditions problem. The important question is this: Would requiring 
public assistance recipients to pass a drug test, without individualized suspicion of 
drug use, unduly “burden” or “impinge upon” their Fourth Amendment interests in 
privacy? Despite the importance of these questions, the principle tools the Court 
relies upon to answer them are hopelessly indeterminate.  
Following the logic of Speiser, Sherbert, and Shapiro would lead courts to ask 
whether policies that condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test are 
best understood as a “penalty” on claimants for exercising their Fourth Amendment 
rights, or better understood as a mere “non-subsidy” of Fourth Amendment rights. 
On one hand, courts could easily conclude that these conditions amount to no more 
than a mere non-subsidy. Even if claimants have a Fourth Amendment right to 
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refuse a drug test, Maher and Harris stand for the proposition that “without more,” 
refusal to fund a protected activity cannot be equated with the imposition of a 
“penalty” on that activity. Following Lyng and Dandridge, courts may conclude that 
while claimants certainly have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a drug test, the 
Constitution does not obligate governments to subsidize the exercise of that right, 
nor does the Constitution shield claimants from the resulting economic hardship. On 
the other hand, Lyng and Dandridge rest uncomfortably with Shapiro and Memorial 
Hospital, where the Court affirmed that the denial of a “basic necessity of life” can 
be tantamount to the imposition of a penalty on the exercise of a fundamental right.  
C. RETHINKING THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE  
Given the current state of affairs, legal scholars have offered a variety of 
approaches to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which range from theories 
based on coercion to the systemic effects of conditional allocations on the 
distribution of power between government and rightholders. None of these 
approaches, however, fully capture what might go wrong when governments 
condition public assistance benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right.  
1. Coercion  
The Supreme Court has often suggested that the problem with unconstitutional 
conditions stems from their coercive effect on beneficiaries.438 The Court took this 
approach in Speiser, where it opined that denying a tax exemption to veterans who 
refuse to sign a loyalty oath would have the effect of “coercing claimants to refrain 
from the proscribed speech.”439 In Sherbert, the Court described the pressure on Mrs. 
Sherbert to forego her Sabbath as “unmistakable,” once again suggesting that the 
problem with offering unemployment benefits on the condition that beneficiaries 
accept Saturday work stems from the coercive pressure placed on beneficiaries.440 
Still, why should we regard these conditions as coercive? In South Dakota v. Dole, 
the Supreme Court held that conditions on otherwise discretionary federal spending 
were permissible insofar as they were not “so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”441 Yet, the problem with this approach is that it 
threatens to sweep far too much under the heading of coercion. Where Justice 
Brennan saw coercion in Sherbert, one might argue that South Carolina merely 
presented Mrs. Sherbert with a hard choice, but such choices are not prima facie 
wrong.442  
In an early and influential article, Seth Kreimer attempts to respond to 
complaints of this kind by proposing a series of baselines—history, equality, and 
prediction—from which to determine whether a conditioned benefit amounts to an 
offer or a coercive threat.443 As Kreimer concedes, the obvious problem with a 
multiple baseline approach is not only that such baselines might well be 
indeterminate, but how should courts proceed when baselines conflict? Beyond that, 
however, his analysis suffers from a number of conceptual problems, most of them 
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stemming from his choice of baselines. Take Kreimer’s example: “If for each of the 
last twenty years the mayor has provided patronage to the advertising department of 
a newspaper, the threat to stop doing so unless the newspaper changes its editorial 
policies would legitimately be viewed as coercion.”444 On the other hand, if the 
mayor announced an intention to provide previously unavailable funds, conditional 
on a change in policy, that announcement would not seem to penalize the existing 
policy, “for it does not reduce the range of choices available to the newspaper.”445 
Using history as the relevant baseline, Kreimer locates coercion in the mayor’s 
threat to make the newspaper worse off than it was before the change in policy.446  
But why should that be the case? It might be that Kreimer’s example works by 
taking advantage of our suspicion that the mayor’s office has used public funds to 
her political advantage: “I’ll let you keep $1000 in public funds if you stop 
criticizing my administration.” Under those circumstances, it would probably matter 
to us that the mayor’s announcement threatens to use public dollars to suppress 
protected First Amendment speech. But suppose the mayor announced that her office 
would no longer continue to provide public funds to papers with a track record of 
libel, or a history of reporting baseless (though not libelous) sleaze. In both cases, 
we might find it more difficult to view her announcement as coercive. What seems 
to matter here is the legal baseline, rather than the historical baseline.  
Suppose instead that in an effort to get kids to read, the mayor issues an 
announcement that for the coming fiscal year her office will condition 5% of 
previously available city patronage on the creation of a children’s section in the local 
paper. Since the city will not offer additional funds, the announcement means that 
newspapers choosing not to comply will lose public dollars on which they have 
come to rely, and the policy will reduce the range of choices available to newspapers 
relative to the historical baseline. If we were to use the historical baseline as a guide, 
Kreimer’s approach would lead us to the conclusion that the mayor’s efforts are at 
least prima facie coercive, rather than an unobjectionable change in public policy.  
Although Kreimer concedes that there a number of problems with the historical 
baseline, similar problems arise if we substitute equality or prediction as the baseline 
from which to determine coercion. Returning to the original example, Kreimer 
claims that even if there were no history of public advertising (and thus we could not 
use history as a baseline) a mayoral decision to place advertising in one paper but 
not another “looks significantly different from” a decision not to buy advertising at 
all.447 In the same way, to Kreimer, excluding Speiser from benefits because he 
refused to sign a loyalty oath “looks like a penalty,” even if veterans were required 
to pay property taxes ex ante.448 But why? Kreimer finds coercion in “singling out” 
individuals for differential treatment merely because they have chosen to exercise 
their constitutional rights, even though in all other respects they are no different 
from similarly situated citizens who have received the benefit.449 While it is true that 
Speiser was in a sense “singled out” for a penalty, why not say that that veterans 
who took the oath received a bonus for their loyalty, and Speiser simply did not 
qualify?450 
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Others, including Kenneth Simons and Seth Kreimer, have argued for a 
predictive baseline so that coercion is determined by measuring the condition against 
what the government would do if it could not impose the condition in question.451 If 
the government would provide the benefit in the normal course of events, the 
condition is a threat; if not, the condition is an offer. However, arguments along 
these lines are irreducibly speculative and perhaps underestimate the willingness to 
defund programs that serve vulnerable populations.452  
2. Systemic Effects  
A second approach, advanced by Kathleen Sullivan, focuses not on coercion, 
but rather on the systemic effects of conditional allocations and the distribution of 
power between government and its citizens.453 As Sullivan writes, a systemic 
account takes as its starting point the proposition that “the preferred constitutional 
liberties at stake in unconstitutional conditions cases do not simply protect 
individual rightholders piecemeal,” but instead “determine the overall distribution of 
power between government and rightholders generally.”454 Sullivan argues that 
unconstitutional conditions not only skew the distribution of power between 
government and rightholders, but also among rightholders insofar as the government 
engages in facial discrimination between those who do and not comply with the 
condition.455 A systemic approach would require strict scrutiny whenever the 
“primary purpose or effect” of the condition is to redistribute power to government 
or “to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction 
favored by government.”456  
When governments impose conditions on public assistance benefits, however, 
their purpose is usually not to pressure the exercise of a constitutional right. In fact, 
Sullivan argues that when a condition has “so obvious a purpose other than 
pressuring rights,” the condition is not suspect and strict scrutiny need not apply.457 
Sullivan describes government efforts to conserve public dollars, or prevent the 
misuse of taxpayer dollars, as prime examples of a non-rights pressuring purpose. 
Instead, Sullivan rests the case for strict review on her claim that imposing a 
condition on public assistance could create an unconstitutional “donor caste” if, for 
example, governments were to condition public assistance on donating an organ to 
an organ bank, or donating service as a surrogate mother in a public program.458  
Sullivan’s approach has the virtue of offering a robust response to critics who 
argue that conditional allocations are unobjectionable to the extent that they are 
“liberty expanding.” Even when a government condition falls short of coercion, the 
condition might be objectionable to the extent that it imposes systemic effects on 
others. With our legacy of slavery and indentured servitude, we might prefer not to 
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live in society where states condition public assistance benefits on invasive surgery 
or surrogate motherhood. Yet, for the most part, state efforts to attach conditions to 
public assistance benefits are not so daring. Nor do they disturb the distribution of 
power between governments and the rightholders that Sullivan describes. Instead, 
state efforts in this area are driven by a non-rights pressuring purpose, and therefore 
fall beyond the systemic approach Sullivan describes.  
3. A Public Health Perspective  
From a public health perspective, the case for strict scrutiny rests on the 
contribution that public assistance benefits make to population health. In its 
unconstitutional conditions cases, the Supreme Court has vacillated between 
affording greater judicial scrutiny to conditions that threaten the subsistence of the 
poor, while in other moments stubbornly refusing to apply more rigorous standards 
to public assistance benefits as it did in Dandridge.459 Below, I assert that judicial 
ambivalence in this area is mistaken. Instead, the limited ability of low-income 
families to protect their interests in the political process provides ample reason for 
courts to apply strict review when legislatures attach conditions to benefits like 
TANF, public housing, or food stamps.  
a. The Social Determinants of Health  
A large body of literature on income and health supports an intuition that most 
of us have developed based on our everyday experience: wealthy people tend to be 
better off and people with higher incomes tend to be healthier than their 
counterparts.460 Within the literature on income and health, several studies suggest 
that income inequality may be a key determinant of population health. A widely 
cited study on income inequality and mortality in the United States found that 
metropolitan areas with high income inequality and low average income had an 
excess mortality of 139.8 deaths per 100,000 people compared with areas of low 
inequality and high income.461 To put these numbers in perspective, the authors note 
that the number of excess deaths due to income inequality exceeds the number of 
deaths due to lung cancer, diabetes, motor vehicle crashes, HIV infection, suicide, 
and homicide combined.462 A similar study found that income inequality in the 
United States was strongly associated with mortality, even after controlling for 
poverty, smoking, median household income, and race.463  
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain why income inequality might 
matter to our health. It may be that income inequality affects health through its 
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impact on spending.464 As the rich flee to gated communities, they tend to rely more 
on privately financed services, leading to underinvestment in public education, 
transportation, health care, and other publically financed services on which low-
income communities rely.465 A second possible pathway involves the relationship 
between income inequality, social capital, and social cohesion.466 A widening 
income gap between the rich and the poor may result in a general erosion of the 
social fabric, leading to increased hostility and distrust.467 Third, income inequality 
may affect our health through its effect on social status and social participation.468 
As the gap between the haves and have-nots widens, material deprivation may 
impede our ability to participate fully in society, leading to isolation and 
depression.469  
An alternative school of thought rejects the income inequality hypothesis and 
instead maintains that absolute income levels are the key determinants of population 
health.470 On the latter view, what matters is whether the “floor is high enough” and 
if it is, relative income might be less important.471 Both hypotheses, however, 
suggest that income assistance programs like TANF can make an important 
contribution to population health, either by narrowing the income gap between 
groups or by elevating the social safety net.  
b. Unconstitutional Conditions  
What might these findings imply for a theory of unconstitutional conditions? In 
his landmark work, Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely addresses the tensions 
that arise between safeguarding the interests of minorities from the tyranny of 
majority rule, while also maintaining faithful adherence to the principles of 
majoritarianism that are the cornerstone of American government.472 Rejecting both 
“clause-bound interpretivism” and the view that courts should be guided by 
fundamental American values, Ely argues instead that the Court should devote itself 
to policing the process of democratic representation.473 Courts are to step in as 
“referee,” intervening to protect those who are unable to protect themselves in the 
political process. Indeed, Ely writes, elected representatives are the last people we 
can trust to identify circumstances in which the political process is unworthy of 
trust:474 
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For if it is not the “many” who are being treated unreasonably but 
rather only some minority, the situation will not be so comfortably 
amenable to political correction. Indeed there may be political 
pressures to encourage our representatives to pass laws that treat the 
majority coalition on whose continued support they rely one way, and 
one or more minorities whose backing they don’t need less 
favorably.475  
In Florida, efforts to condition public assistance benefits like TANF on passing 
a drug test are exceedingly popular among voters. According to a 2011 Quinnipiac 
poll, seventy-one percent of Florida voters support the law, including ninety percent 
of Republicans.476 For Republican Governor Rick Scott, adding a drug test to 
Florida’s TANF program offered a bright spot in an otherwise lackluster first term, 
while also satisfying a campaign promise to clean up welfare policies in Florida by 
requiring applicants to pass a drug test. Unsurprisingly, the latest crop of drug 
testing bills popped up in state legislatures during an election year, and at a time 
when states are wrestling with shrinking budgets following the Great Recession. The 
current climate, both fiscal and political, enables state legislators to reform welfare 
programs in ways that are appealing to their coalitions, while also disregarding the 
interests of low-income communities that will inevitably absorb the costs of those 
reforms.  
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court acknowledged the “dramatically 
real factual difference” between the desperate circumstances of persons seeking 
public assistance and other instances in which the Court applied rational basis 
review.477 Yet, the Court refused to apply a more rigorous standard. Instead, Justice 
Stewart expressed the reluctance of the Court to police the substance of welfare 
policies, adding: “the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems 
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this 
Court.”478 However, if Ely is correct, then heightened scrutiny may be required when 
the political market is malfunctioning—as it might be if the “ins” have restricted the 
channels of political change, or “representatives beholden to an effective majority 
are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility” or 
prejudice.479 
In its Equal Protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that the poor are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class, and in much the same 
way, the Court has hesitated to apply strict review when legislatures condition public 
assistance on the waiver of a constitutional right.480 However, not unlike other 
groups for whom the Supreme Court has applied a more rigorous standard, the poor 
lack access to the political process in a way that would enable them to safeguard 
their own rights. An approach to unconstitutional conditions that focuses on the 
widening gap between the haves and the have-nots would direct courts to apply strict 
scrutiny whenever legislatures attach conditions to public assistance benefits, due to 
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the limited ability of low-income families to protect their own interests in the 
political process.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
How should population-based legal analysis factor into our thinking about drug 
testing and public assistance? Wendy Parmet and I are in agreement that too often 
courts invoke public health to justify regulations without actually considering the 
health effects of those policies. Further public health methodologies can help courts 
determine whether states have met their burden to establish a genuine threat to 
public safety under the special needs doctrine. The insights of social epidemiology 
can also lead us to embrace a broader understanding of Fourth Amendment values 
beyond privacy. In the same way, public health can provide a set of reasons to apply 
strict scrutiny in unconstitutional conditions cases, beyond coercion and systemic 
effects.  
Nonetheless, population-based analysis remains frustratingly indeterminate. 
Parmet urges courts to embrace population health as “a chief value of law,” one that 
“judges and lawyers should apply when they interpret legal texts and authority.”481 
Yet, Parmet stops short of assigning real consequence to population health. She 
never, for example, argues that a particular statute or regulation is unlawful or 
unconstitutional insofar as it conflicts with insights of public health. As I argued 
above,482 if we think that courts should not allow population health to trump 
conventional legal reasoning—or that population health should only play a 
supporting role in our thinking—then Parmet cannot make good on her claim that 
population-based analysis is indeed a tool of legal reasoning, and not merely a policy 
perspective from which to critique legal decisions.  
To say that population-based analysis is often better understood as a policy 
perspective is not to diminish its importance. From a public health perspective, 
policies that result in withholding public assistance benefits from illegal drug users 
are unlikely to accomplish many of the states’ objectives and could make many 
social problems much worse. We know that public assistance programs like TANF 
provide a valuable opportunity to identify people with substance abuse problems and 
get them into treatment. For example, a 2006 study on women and substance abuse 
found that low-income women who used illegal drugs and continued to receive cash 
assistance through TANF were more than twice as likely to receive substance abuse 
treatment when compared to low-income women who also used illegal drugs but did 
not receive cash assistance.483 Decades of research on addiction also point toward 
harm reduction methods as the approach most likely to lead to lasting reductions in 
drug use.484 Finally, for most low-income women who receive public assistance, 
childcare concerns, transportation problems, poor academic skills, and language 
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barriers are perhaps more common, and they present more important obstacles to 
full-time employment than illegal drug use.485 Despite our current focus on 
substance abuse and welfare, given the real problems facing low-income families, 
states must look elsewhere.  
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